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NOTE 
Fighting Exclusion From Televised Presidential Debates: 
Minor-Party Candidates' Standing To Challenge 
Sponsoring Organizations' Tax-Exempt Status 
Gregory P. Magarian 
As American voters grow increasingly alienated from their elected 
leaders and interest groups focus ever more sharply on narrow goals, 
minor-party candidates1 are likely to become more important players 
in federal elections. As it began, the 1992 presidential race offered 
minor parties an especially dramatic opportunity to exploit the weak-
ness of the national Democratic Party.2 Severe legal and structural 
disadvantages, however, limit minor parties' chances for electoral suc-
cess at the national level in ways that are at odds with the core princi-
ples of American democracy.3 The mass media potentially hold the 
best hope for minor-party competition in the national arena, but media 
exposure often eludes minor-party candidates. Televised presidential 
debates, which provide candidates unique opportunities to boost their 
stature and project their messages, typify this dilemma.4 The organi-
zations which sponsor televised debates-the League of Women Vot-
ers Education Fund through the 1988 primaries, and since then the 
bipartisan Commission for Presidential Debates (CPD) - consistently 
employ rigorous standards that exclude minor-party candidates.5 
Minor-party candidates have occasionally tried, and failed, to chal-
1. This Note uses the generic term "minor parties" to refer to ad hoc interest groups organ· 
ized as parties for specific elections, support groups which form around independent individual 
candidates, and minor parties, such as the Libertarian and Socialist Workers' parties, which have 
existed continuously over several election cycles. Although they function outside the political 
mainstream and share a common interest in weakening the political dominance of the Demo-
cratic and Republican parties, these different types of minor parties often form and operate differ· 
ently. See generally FRANK SMALLWOOD, THE OTHER CANDIDATES: THIRD PARTIES JN 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (1983). 
2. See James Ridgeway, Politics as Unusual· The Parties Are Boring, But the Indies Aren't, 
VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 17, 1991, at 25 (claiming that the major parties no longer provide "a sense 
of real citizen participation, leaving more and more people searching for a real connection with 
the nation's future"). Even a candidate for the Democratic Party's 1992 presidential nomination, 
Jerry Brown, has built his campaign around the declaration that " '[t]here is only one party in 
America - the Incumbent Party.' " Marc Cooper, The Home Shopping Candidate, VILLAGE 
VOICE, Dec. 31, 1991, at 18. 
3. See infra section 111.B. 
4. See infra section 111.C. 
5. See SIDNEY KRAUS, TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES AND PUBLIC POLICY 140-42 
(1988); SMALLWOOD, supra note l, at 270-72; see also Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1326-27 
(D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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lenge their exclusions from deb~tes on direct constitutional grounds. 6 
But one candidate, the New Alliance Party's Lenora Fulani, has twice 
advanced a novel legal attack against the televised debate system's ex-
clusion of minor party candidates. Under Federal Election Commis-
sion regulation I I0.13(a), only tax-exempt organizations may sponsor 
televised debates.7 To receive tax-exempt status under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an organization must abstain 
from partisan political activity.8 Fulani has argued that the Treasury 
Department's granting of tax-exempt status to the League of Women 
Voters and the CPD violates the statute because, by limiting debates to 
major party candidates, the organizations engage in impermissible par-
tisan political activity.9 If Fulani's challenge resulted in revocation of 
a sponsoring organization's tax exemption, Rule 110.13(a) would bar 
that organization from sponsoring debates. 
The defendant Treasury Department and sponsoring organizations 
replied that Fulani lacked standing to challenge the organizations' tax 
status.10 The Second Circuit recognized Fulani's standing to maintain 
the action, 11 while the District of Columbia Circuit denied standing.12 
The ultimate resolution of this issue will strongly influence the future 
of minor-party candidacies in the United States: judicial recognition 
of standing in this context could lead to eventual victory on the merits 
6. See, e.g., Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications Commn., 917 F.2d 486 (11th Cir. 
1990) (no violation of First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to 
sponsor two.party gubernatorial debate); De Young v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing minor-party candidate had no First Amendment right to appear in televised debate); Johnson 
v. F.C.C., 829 F.2d 157 (D.C Cir. 1987) (same). 
7. The regulation on "Nonpartisan candidate debates" states, in relevant part: 
Staging organizations. (1) A non-profit organization which is exempt from federal taxation 
under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), and a nonprofit organization which is exempt from federal taxa-
tion under 26 U.S.C. 50l(c)(4) and which does not endorse, support or oppose political 
candidates or political parties may stage nonpartisan candidate debates in accordance with 
11 CFR 110.13(b) and 114.4(e). 
11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a) (1991). 
8. Section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the statute under which the government 
has granted both the League and the C.P.D. tax-exempt status, exempts from federal taxation, in 
relevant part: 
(A)ny •.• fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for ... charitable ..• or 
educational purposes ••. , no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
•.• individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda ... , 
and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing and distributing 
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office. 
I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1988). 
9. Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1325, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fulani v. League of Women Voters 
Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). 
10. Standing doctrine involves a set of rules that determine whether a litigant may raise a 
particular issue in a particular court. Lack of standing effectively prevents a plaintiff from pursu-
ing her claim. 
11. See League, 882 F.2d at 628. 
12. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1331. 
840 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:838 
for a minor-party candidale.13 The standing battle will also affect the 
future of standing jurisprudence as a whole: standing for candidates 
to mount tax challenges would boost other third-party challenges to 
regulatory decisions and affirm our legal system's capacity to confront 
coherently some of its deeply rooted inequities. 
This Note argues that courts should recognize minor-party presi-
dential candidates' standing to challenge the section 50l(c)(3) tax-ex-
empt status of organizations sponsoring televised debates that exclude 
minor-party candidates. Part I situates the issue within the context of 
the Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence and concludes that the 
validity of a third-party tax-status challenge by an aggrieved minor-
party presidential candidate remains an open question. Part II ana-
lyzes the Second and District of Columbia Circuits' decisions and con-
cludes that the Second Circuit's approach properly interprets the 
Supreme Court's standing doctrine and correctly resolves the particu-
lar arguments which both courts consider. Part III first demonstrates 
that the Supreme Court's standing doctrine permits an inquiry into the 
public interests which granting standing in this context may advance. 
It then examines political scientists' conclusions about minor parties in 
U.S. politics and argues that the inherent inequities of our political 
structure, the importance of media exposure in elections, and the so-
cial value of minor-party candidacies support granting standing for 
minor-party candidates. Part IV explores some of the questions which 
the U.S. political system will need to address if courts grant standing 
for minor-party candidates and the plaintiffs eventually win their chal-
lenges to debate sponsors' tax exemptions. This Note concludes that 
courts should grant standing for minor-party presidential candidates 
to challenge the tax-exempt status of organizations that exclude them 
from televised debates. 
I. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has characterized standing as involving both 
constitutional and prudential considerations. 14 The Court has located 
three standing requirements in Article III of the Constitution: the 
plaintiff must have suffered a personal injury-in-fact; the injury must 
be fairly traceable to defendant's allegedly illegal conduct; and the 
plaintiff's requested relief must be likely to redress her alleged in-
jury.15 Although the elements often overlap conceptually, 16 the Court 
13. See infra Part IV. 
14. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("Standing doctrine embraces several 
judicially self-imposed limits .••. The requirement of standing, however, has a core component 
derived directly from the Constitution."). 
15. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). For a discussion of the traceability and redressability requirements, see 
infra section I.B. 
16. For example, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-07 (1975), the Court combines a no-
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typically analyzes them in succession. The Court also considers vari-
ous "prudential" limitations on standing beyond the direct constitu-
tional limitations.17 
This Part examines how the Supreme Court's doctrine affects a 
minor-party candidate's standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of 
a debate sponsor. Section I.A discusses the Court's injury-in-fact re-
quirement, the dominant prong of the Court's three-pronged constitu-
tional standing analysis. Section I.B examines the Court's decisions 
denying standing for lack of traceability and redressability, focusing 
on the major cases denying standing for third-party challenges to regu-
latory action. It concludes that the Court will not deny a plaintiff 
standing simply because she alleges an indirect harm. Section I.C 
briefly discusses the Court's prudential limitations on standing and 
concludes that they do not apply to third-party tax status challenges. 
A. Injury in Fact 
1. The Doctrine 
The Supreme Court typically begins its standing analysis with the 
injury-in-fact requirement.18 The requirement, initially articulated in 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 19 
ensures that a court will resolve legal issues "in a concrete factual con-
text conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judi-
cial action."20 The Court has noted that tying each ruling to all of the 
facts of each particular case reduces the precedential value of any one 
standing decision.21 The Court's decisions nonetheless draw certain 
broad lines: a plaintiff's injury-in-fact need not be economically quan-
tifiable, and many other people may share the injury.22 Furthermore, 
the Court does not consider the magnitude of a plaintiff's alleged in-
injury with a no-traceability analysis. Plaintiff residents of Rochester, New York contended that 
neighboring Penfield's zoning ordinances precluded construction of low-income housing. After 
finding that plaintiffs had not suffered cognizable injuries, the Court accepted plaintiffs' allega-
tion that the ordinance had increased housing prices in Penfield for the purpose of separately 
discussing traceability. 422 U.S. at 504. But the Court never recognized, even arguendo, any 
harm stemming from this alleged effect; its traceability analysis therefore lacked an injury to 
trace, leading it to find no traceability. 422 U.S. at 506-07. The Court failed to explain convinc-
ingly why, after it had rejected standing for lack of injury, it needed to inquire into traceability. 
17. See infra section I.C. 
18. The plaintiff's injury need not have manifested itself to satisfy the injury-in-fact standard; 
a threatened injury may suffice. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 
(1979). 
19. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (companion case). 
20. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 404, 472 (1982). 
21. 454 U.S. at 472; see also Data Processing, 391 U.S. at 151 ("Generalizations about stand-
ing to sue are largely worthless as such."). 
22. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 686 (1973). The Court has, however, restricted standing for claims of generalized 
constitutional grievances as a prudential limitation. See infra section I.e. 
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jury.23 The critical consideration is whether the plaintiff actually suf-
fered the alleged injury; if not, the Court's examination of her claim 
"becom[es] no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value 
interests of concerned bystanders"24 and "an ingenious academic exer-
cise in the conceivable."25 
Examination of Supreme Court and circuit court decisions apply-
ing the injury-in-fact requirement demonstrate that a broad range of 
actual, personal injuries may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. 
The Supreme Court has recognized intangible injuries to plaintiff's in-
terest based upon environmental degradation.26 In United States v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), plain-
tiff environmentalists claimed injury from environmental degradation 
resulting from a federal commercial regulation.27 The Court recog-
nized plaintiffs' injuries, stressing that plaintiffs had alleged cognizable 
personal injuries to their individual use and enjoyment of natural re-
sources. 28 The Court recognized similar but more acute injuries in 
Duke Power Co. ·v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. 29 Plain-
tiffs in that case, including residents living near a nuclear power plant, 
claimed several immediate harms from a regulation facilitating the 
plant's operation; the Court found these injuries sufficient to support 
standing. 30 In both of these cases, the Court recognized arguably re-
mote, ideologically motivated injuries because plaintiffs demonstrated 
that the challenged actions affected them directly and personally. 
Lower federal courts have followed the Supreme Court's tendency 
to recognize environmental injuries. An environmental group whose 
members used national wildlife refuges to observe wildlife alleged a 
sufficient injury to challenge opening of the refuges to hunting.31 An-
23. 412 U.S. at 689 n.14. 
24. 412 U.S. at 687. 
25. 412 U.S. at 688. 
26. One commentator argues that environmental cases have led courts to transcend the tradi-
tional private law focus of the injury-in-fact requirement because ordinary experience allows 
courts to recognize the individual stakes in communal environmental interests. Steven L. Win· 
ter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem o/Se/f-Govemance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1491 
(1988). 
27. 412 U.S. at 675-76 (Plaintiffs challenged the Interstate Commerce Commission's increase 
in rates for rail freight carriers on the ground that the increase would harm the environment by 
encouraging use of nonrecyclable products.). 
28. 412 U.S. at 689. The Court distinguished Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) 
(denying environmental group's standing to challenge federal approval of ski resort in natural 
forest), noting that plaintiffs in that case had alleged only a special interest in preserving the 
environment rather than personal injury from environmental damage. 412 U.S. at 685; see also 
Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Socy., 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986) (holding that 
adverse effect on plaintiff's watching and studying of whales was a sufficient injury·in·fact to 
support standing in suit to compel federal agency to take action under statute restricting 
whaling). 
29. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
30. 438 U.S. at 73. 
31. Humane Socy. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The Court rejected the 
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other group had standing to cpalleµge ~g regiilations where it 
claimed harm to the aesthetiC and recreational interests of its mem-
bers. 32 An appellate court also found standing for consumer groups to 
raise challenges to federal automobile emissions standards on the the-
ory that the standards impinged upon consumers' freedoms to 
purchase the types of cars they wanted. 33 As in the preceding cases, 
the court recognized harms in the two emissions cases because the 
plaintiffs were able to allege tangible, personal stakes in the legal issues 
involved. 
Outside the environmental context, courts have been less willing to 
recognize injuries-in-fact in controversial cases. The Supreme Court 
denied an advocacy group standing to challenge a conveyance of land 
from the federal government to a religious college at a discounted 
price. 34 Plaintiffs claimed harm from violation of the constitutional 
separation of church and state; the Court found the injury insufficient 
because plaintiffs failed to plead any direct personal injury resulting 
from the alleged constitutional viohttion. 35 The Court hinted that 
some harm to plaintiffs' interests from the property transfer itself 
might have sufficed for standing purposes, 36 but the mere "observation 
of conduct with which one disagrees"37 did not. 
The Court similarly found no cognizable injury where plaintiffs al-
leged that a community's zoning ordinance hindered their ability to 
find affordable, low-income housing. 38 The Court concluded that 
plaintiffs were merely residents of the area which the ordinance af-
fected, not intended residents of specific projects, and thus suffered no 
personal injuries. 39 These alleged injuries seem no more remote or 
ideologically rooted than those alleged by plaintiffs in SCRAP and 
Duke Power. The Court also offered no policy bases for distinguishing 
the two sets of cases, but the Court has hewed strictly to its injury-in-
fact standard. 
Commentators have sharply criticized the injury-in-fact standard 
as a foundation for standing jurisprudence, charging that its un-
Society's other claimed injury, to its special interest in wildlife preservation, as insufficient to 
support standing. 840 F.2d at 51-52. 
32. National Wildlife Fedn. v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
33. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 
112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing injury from decreased opportunity to buy larger, purport-
edly safer cars); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 
1322, 1332-34 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (recognizing injury from decreased opportunity to buy smaller, 
more fuel-efficient cars). 
34. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
35. 454 U.S. at 485. 
36. 454 U.S. at 486-87. 
37. 454 U.S. at 485. 
38. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
39. 422 U.S. at 507-08. 
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workability has led to inconsistent application, 40 that it cannot assure 
"vigorous and responsible advocacy" if applied - as the Court has at 
least ostensibly directed - only to tangible injuries,41 that it repre-
sents a logically indefensible encroachment upon Congress' power to 
create enforceable rights, 42 and that it fragments social interests by 
failing to recognize altruistic motives for legal challenges.43 Commen-
tators have further complained that the requirement, taken to its ex-
treme, wholly precludes challenges to constitutional violations by the 
government that affect all citizens in kind.44 Despite these objections, 
injury-in-fact remains the most important component of the constitu-
tional standing analysis. 45 The case law demonstrates that the plaintiff 
40. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 73-79 (1984) [Herein-
after Nichol, Rethinking Standing]. Nichol praises the Data Processing Court's effort to ground 
the injury requirement in an objective basis for determining standing apart from the merits of 
claims. Id. at 74. But he concludes that the standard proved too malleable to fulfill its constitu-
tional role, leading to artificial distinctions in later cases between sufficient and insufficient inju-
ries. Id. at 75-78. Nichol later sharpened his attack on the injury requirement, concluding that 
injury-in-fact "is particularly vulnerable to distortion." Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: 
A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 653 (1985) [hereinafter Nichol, Abusing 
Standing]; see also William Burnham, Injury for Standing Purposes When Constitutional Rights 
Are Violated: Common Law Public Value Adjudication at Work, 13 HAsnNGS CoNST. L.Q. 57, 
111-12 (1985) (arguing that the injury-in-fact standard increases "the difficulty and uncertainty 
in ascertaining injury,'' leading to untenable distinctions in the case law). 
41. Burnham, supra note 40, at 108. Burnham gives the Court some credit for applying the 
injury-in-fact standard to less tangible injuries but attributes more flexible applications to "the 
Court's failure to clearly perceive the true nature of ••• injury in fact" and to the difficulty which 
the requirement poses to judges and lawyers. Id. at 110. 
42. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 233 (1988). Fletcher 
contends that the Court's creation of a standing hurdle which Congress cannot remove by statute 
"limit[s] the power of Congress to define and protect against certain kinds of injury that the 
Court thinks it improper to protect against." But cf. C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciabi/ity Deci-
sions of the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 862, 881-82 (1985) (suggesting that Con-
gress, by creating statutory interests which supersede courts' prudential limitations on standing, 
may remove standing hurdles which the Court cannot remove through constitutional 
adjudication). 
43. Winter, supra note 26, at 1503. 
44. See David L. Doernberg, "We the People": John Lacke, Collective Constitutional Rights, 
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 92-95 (1985); Fletcher, supra 
note 42, at 272 (arguing that constitutional standing analysis should rely on the underlying claim 
asserted rather than on an abstract requirement such as injury-in-fact). See generally Burnham, 
supra note 40, at 71-81. The Court, when faced with egregious but technically unactionable 
violations, might simply cut through the injury-in-fact requirement due to the importance of the 
interest at stake. Professor Burnham argues that the Court has done just that, adjudicating based 
upon public values in such areas as equal protection and voting rights. Id. at 82-89. But, as 
Burnham suggests, only a more principled solution can prevent "hidden agendas and intellectual 
dishonesty." Id. at 117. 
45. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fedn. v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (calling 
injury-in-fact "the core of standing"). Injury-in-fact is necessarily the most important compo-
nent of the constitutional analysis because it logically precedes the traceability and redressability 
requirements. Moreover, courts rarely recognize an injury as cognizable and proceed to deny 
standing on one of the other constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. 
Study Group Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72-78 (1978) (finding sufficient causal relationship after finding 
cognizable injury); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 503-08 (1975) (denying traceability and redres-
sability only after having denied injury-in-fact). But see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-57 
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who can confidently assert a tangible, personal injury is likely to win 
standing even for a causally remote or ideologically motivated injury. 
2. The Standard in Competitor Standing Cases 
The "competitor standing" doctrine, which allows standing for a 
plaintiff involved in an enterprise who challenges a policy that illegally 
benefits her competitor(s), figured prominently in the Second and D.C. 
Circuits' analyses of Fulani's standing. This doctrine, developed in 
economic competition cases, allows plaintiffs to challenge government 
actions that place them at competitive disadvantage. Such a disadvan-
tage clearly satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement: the Supreme 
Court in the Data Processing case articulated that requirement in a 
competitor standing context. 46 Plaintiffs in that case, providers of 
data processing services, proved that an allegedly unlawful Comptrol-
ler of Currency regulation expanding the range of services national 
banks could provide "might entail some future loss of profits" and that 
the banks had already prepared to provide services to some of plain-
tiffs' customers. 47 The Court held there was "no doubt" that plaintiffs 
had alleged an actual injury.4s 
The Court continued to develop the competitor standing doctrine 
in financial service contexts. In a subsequent case, investment compa-
nies challenged a regulation that permitted banks to operate collective 
investment funds in alleged violation of a federal statute. The Court 
held that Data Processing "foreclosed" defendant's challenge to plain-
tiff's standing.49 Although the facts of the two cases were similar, the 
plaintiffs, statutes, and services involved were distinct; the Court's 
wholesale grafting of the Data Processing holding onto the subsequent 
case suggests that the competitor standing doctrine carries considera-
ble precedential force. The Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine 
when it recognized a financial service trade organization's standing to 
challenge a ruling of the Comptroller allowing a bank to offer discount 
brokerage services. 50 Aside from its distinct fact situation, the case 
differed from the Court's earlier competitor standing decisions in that 
the plaintiff challenged a specific agency ruling rather than a regula-
(1984) (recognizing injury-in-fact where government action arguably diminished children's right 
to education in an integrated school but denying standing for lack of traceability). 
46. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). Data 
Processing also articulated the prudential zone of interests test for standing, 397 U.S. at 153, a 
factor which was important in that decision and has continued to play a prominent role in subse-
quent cases. See infra section l.C. 
47. 397 U.S. at 152. 
48. 397 U.S. at 152. 
49. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620 (1971). 
50. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 403 (1987). The Court's discussion in 
this case centered on the zone of interests test, apparently reflecting a lack of controversy about 
the sufficiency of plaintiff's injury to support standing. See 479 U.S. at 394-403. 
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tion of general application.st The Court has not wavered from its ap-
proval of injury to competitive interests as a basis for standing. 
The District of Columbia's federal courts have also applied the 
competitor standing doctrine, not only to redress similar economic in-
juries, s2 but also to protect political rights. In an early case, the D.C. 
District Court recognized the rights of voters, political workers, and 
campaign contributors to sue major-party campaign organizations for 
alleged violations of statutes limiting campaign contributions.s3 
Although plaintiffs sued their competitors, rather than challenging a 
government action as the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court's competitor 
standing cases had done, the district court acknowledged an injury 
analogous to competitive disadvantage: that "the votes of the plain-
tiffs and their efforts to effect the nomination or election of individuals 
of their choice are likely to be, as a practical matter, diluted or even 
nullified. "S4 
The D.C. Circuit subsequently permitted individuals and organiza-
tions to challenge election regulations and statutes affecting their polit-
ical activities on even more clearly defined competitor standing 
theories. ss The court's analysis turned on recognition of alleged 
harms from competitive disadvantages to plaintiffs' "political voices 
- their influence in federal elections"S6 through campaign contribu-
tionss7 and lobbying. ss In extending competitor standing into the 
political sphere, the D.C. courts worked no great innovation but sim-
ply recalled the Supreme Court's maxim that injury, for standing pur-
51. 479 U.S. at 390-92. 
52. See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rec-
ognizing plaintiff oil businessman's injury-in-fact from tax credits extended to foreign nations for 
oil extraction but denying standing for failure to satisfy zone of interests test), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978). 
This Part's focus on District of Columbia case law in examining the lower-court development 
of standing is not deliberate. The D.C. courts simply decide more significant standing cases than 
courts in other regions because of the large number of challenges to federal statutes and regula-
tions which they hear. As a result, the D.C. Circuit has become the leading forum for elabora-
tion of the Supreme Court's standing doctrines. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. National 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding standing for consumer 
group to challenge federal automobile emissions standards based upon alleged injuries stemming 
from diminished availability of light trucks). 
53. Common Cause v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 808-09 (D.D.C. 1971). 
54. 333 F. Supp. at 808. 
55. See International Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Inc. v. Federal Election 
Commn., 678 F.2d 1092, 1098 (D.C. Cir.) Qabor union members, eligible to vote, raised chal-
lenge to Federal Election Commission rulings on corporate political solicitation practices), affd., 
459 U.S. 983 (1982); Taxation With Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (nonprofit organization challenged 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) prohibition against lobbying by 
nonprofits), revd. on other grounds, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
56. Machinists, 678 F.2d at 1098. 
57. 678 F.2d at 1098. 
58. Taxation, 616 F.2d at 722-23. 
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poses, need not affect plaintiffs economically.59 
Federal courts have not hesitated to reject competitor standing 
theories when plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient injuries-in-fact. In 
American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 60 a travel in-
dustry organization challenged the Treasury Department's failure to 
collect taxes from nonprofit groups which ran travel enterprises that 
allegedly competed with the organization's business.61 The D.C. Cir-
cuit denied the organization's standing, finding that plaintiffs "ha[d] 
not indicated with sufficient specificity either the manner in which 
th~ir alleged injury occurred or the nature of that injury," but had 
instead simply alleged "creation of an unfair competitive 
atmosphere .... "62 · 
Courts have also rejected claims of injury to competitive political 
advantage. In In re United States Catholic Conference the Second Cir-
cuit denied standing for pro-choice Catholic clergy and activists to 
challenge the Catholic Church's tax exemption because plaintiffs failed 
to show that they were engaged in actual competition with the church 
in any particular political enterprise. 63 The court found implicit in 
Data Processing and its progeny "a requirement that in order to estab-
lish an injury as a competitor a plaintiff must show that he personally 
competes in the same arena with the party to whom the government 
has bestowed the assertedly illegal benefit."64 The D.C. District Court 
similarly rejected the competitor standing theories of pro-Palestinian 
activists seeking to challenge the tax-exempt status of Jewish organiza-
tions. 65 As in Catholic Conference, the court found that plaintiffs' al-
leged political setbacks were too vague to transcend mere objection to 
"conduct with which one disagrees" and rise to the level of actual 
injury.66 
These cases denying competitive advocate standing are the excep-
59. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
60. 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 (1978). 
61. 566 F.2d at 147-48. 
62. 566 F.2d at 148, 149. The court suggested that plaintiff could have pleaded a sufficient 
harm by identifying patrons of the nonprofit organizations' travel enterprises "who might legiti-
mately be expected to do business with a private travel agent in the event appellees enforced the 
relevant tax code provisions according to appellants' reco=endations." 566 F.2d at 148. Be-
sides seeming to bear more on redressability than on injury-in-fact, this invitii.tion to hypothetical 
pleading undermines the court's attempt to distinguish between an actual injury and a mere effect 
on the competitive environment. Even so, the court's formulation does not measurably alter the 
competitor standing doctrine because it still permits plaintiffs to prove injury by pleading specific 
adverse effects from competitive disadvantage. 
63. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United Stat~ Catholic Conference, 110 S. 
Ct. 1946 (1990). 
64. 885 F.2d at 1029. 
65. Khalafv. Regan, 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9269 (D.D.C. 1985). 
66. 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 87,591 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982)). 
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tions that prove the doctrine. In none of them did a court mitigate 
either the Supreme Court's conception of the doctrine or its genesis in 
the D.C. Circuit. Rather, the courts rested their rejections squarely on 
deficiencies in the specificity of pleadings. Such deficiencies should de-
feat claims of injury-in-fact in any standing analysis. 67 These courts' 
rigorous applications of the doctrine, along with the numerous deci-
sions recognizing injury-in-fact where plaintiffs have shown specific, 
personal injuries to competitive advantages, demonstrate that competi-
tive injuries fully satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of the constitu-
tional standing test. 
B. Traceability and Redressability 
1. The Doctrine 
Once a plaintiff has established an injury-in-fact, she must show 
both that her injury can reasonably be traced to the challenged con-
duct and that the court can redress the injury by granting the relief she 
seeks. 68 Courts employ the traceability and redressability require-
ments to weed out cases in which causal relationships between injuries 
and illegal acts are "too attenuated" or prospects for relief from a 
favorable disposition are "too speculative."69 Thus, the plaintiffs in 
Warth v. Seldin 70 failed to show a sufficient causal link between their 
inability to secure low-income housing and defendant town's zoning 
ordinance. 71 Similarly, supporters of an unsuccessful presidential can-
didate failed to show that alleged illegal acts of his opponent, the in-
cumbent president, limited their ability to induce support for their 
candidate. 72 In another case, advocates for the handicapped could not 
demonstrate that an FCC order permitting a radio station's owner to 
purchase the station had caused the station's allegedly unlawful disre-
gard for rights of the handicapped. 73 Even so, plaintiffs need not an-
ticipate and rebut every speculative, hypothetical infirmity which 
defendants might raise. 74 In addition to the court's degree of comfort 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39. 
68. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-46 (1976). Although the 
Court first articulated the traceability and redressability standards in Simon, the essential con-
cept dates at least to Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). Holding in that case that a 
woman lacked standing to challenge a government agency's failure to pursue her husband for 
overdue support payments, the Court stated that plaintiffs must show an injury "resulting from 
the putatively illegal action" in order to have standing. 410 U.S. at 617. 
69. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
70. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
71. 422 U.S. at 506-07. 
72. Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 
(1980). 
73. California Assn. of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 825 (D.C. 
Cir. 1985). 
74. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 77-78 (1978). In 
Duke Power, defendant nuclear plant operator unsuccessfully attacked traceability and redres-
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in following plaintiff's causal claim, successful showings of traceability 
and redressability rely on whether plaintiff defines his injuries in pro-
portion to the illegal acts he charges. 75 
The early development of the traceability and redressability stan-
dards suggests that they are aspects of the same test. 76 But the 
Supreme Court has explicitly distinguished the two standards as they 
apply to cases "in which the relief requested goes well beyond the vio-
lation of law alleged."77 Differentiating between the two require-
ments, the Court stated: "To the extent there is a difference, it is that 
the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly un-
lawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the 
causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief re-
quested. "78 Because virtually all plaintiffs in cases involving standing 
issues sue for injunctive or declaratory relief against the illegal conduct 
charged, the redressability requirement becomes academic. 79 In any 
event, the D.C. Circuit has also equated traceability and redressability 
where the relief requested is cessation of the illegal conduct80 or where 
the claimed injury will occur in the future as the result of an agency 
action.81 Even courts that analyze traceability and redressability sepa-
sability by contending that, had Congress never passed the challenged act facilitating private 
development of nuclear power, the government would have developed nuclear power on its own, 
causing the same injuries which plaintiffs claimed from the plant. 438 U.S. at 77-78. See also Jet 
Courier Servs. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221, 1226 (6th Cir. 1983) (not speculative 
that plaintiffs' claimed business injuries would result from challenged administrative rulings). 
Plaintiffs frequently must defeat less speculative counterfactuals which may cast doubt on the 
causal sources of their injuries. See, e.g., Warth. 422 U.S. at 505-07 (suggesting that nonexistence 
of challenged zoning ordinances would not necessarily have resulted in the construction of low-
income housing, the absence of which constituted the injury upon which plaintiffs sued). 
75. Professor Sunstein argues that, in practice, the outcome of the traceability and redres-
sability inquiries ''will turn in large part not on causation itself, but on how the relevant injury is 
characterized and on what sorts of injuries qualify as legally cognizable." Cass R. Sunstein, 
Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoL. L. REV. 1432, 1458 (1988). 
76. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976) (defining 
plaintiffs' claims of redressability and traceability as "equally speculative"); see also Duke Power. 
438 U.S. at 74 (describing the traceability requirement as the redressability requirement "put 
otherwise"). 
77. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19 (1984) (challenging failure to avoid granting tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools). 
78. 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. 
79. Indeed, Allen's denial of traceability without denying redressability is extremely unusual. 
The Court found that plaintiffs' suit exceeded the scope of defendant's alleged illegal acts because 
the requested injunction would have barred tax exemptions for a broader class of private schools 
than those which engaged in open racial discrimination. 468 U.S. at 746-47. The Court failed to 
explain why it could not simply have analyzed the standing issue with regard to only those 
schools which discriminate openly. 
80. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 
113 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Dellums v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 863 F.2d 968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 
1988); National Wildlife Fedn. v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
81. California Assn. of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 828 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., dissenting). 
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rately generally rule the same way on both. s2 
Scholars and courts have criticized the traceability and redres-
sability requirements for a number of reasons. Several have com-
plained that the Supreme Court has applied the standards 
inconsistently from case to case, fostering an uncomfortably subjective 
climate. 83 One commentator sympathetic to this objection suggested 
that causation standards should enter into standing analysis at the 
formative stage of laws and regulations. 84 This approach would en-
sure consistent standing rulings in subsequent litigation. Commenta-
tors have also criticized the redressability requirement as demanding 
excessive certainty.ss Traceability and redressability appear to be set-
tled features on the Supreme Court's standing landscape, but these 
criticisms, and the precedential inconsistencies that have prompted 
them, underscore the elusiveness of these requirements. 
2. The Standards in Challenges to Federal Regulatory 
Status of Third Parties 
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's injury-in-fact need 
not result directly from the defendant's allegedly illegal act. Rather, 
the injury may issue from a third party, not before the Court, whose 
harmful behavior the challenged act makes possible. 86 Such indirect 
causation may simply make plaintiff's showing of traceability - and, 
by extension, redressability - more difficult as a practical matter. 87 
The issue of "third party causation" arises most frequently in cases 
82. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 
1322, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (distinguishing traceability and redressability requirements but 
finding both requirements satisfied through parallel analyses). 
83. See, e.g., Nichol, Rethinking Standing, supra note 40, at 79-82 (noting the Court's "in-
ability to maintain a principled line" in redressability analysis); Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra 
note 40, at 656-57 (concluding that the Court's inconsistent applications of redressability made 
"the conclusion that standing turns on judicial whim seem[] almost unavoidable"); Sunstein, 
supra note 75, at 1458-59 (finding that traceability and redressability "have reintroduced pre-
cisely the sort of unpredictability that the Data Processing test was intended to eliminate"). 
84. Fletcher, supra note 42, at 242-43. This suggestion appears similar to other commenta-
tors' urgings to base standing analysis more closely on statutory and constitutional expressions of 
intent to protect particular parties under particular provisions. See David P. Currie, Misunder-
standing Standing, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 41; Floyd, supra note 42, at 880-87. 
85. See Fletcher, supra note 42, at 240-42 (objecting to the Court's implication in Linda R.S. 
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), "that a person with a legal right to a particular remedy loses 
that right when she seeks to achieve something else indirectly by means of that remedy and when 
it is unlikely that the ultimate goal will be achieved"); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1458 (pointing 
out that "[t]he consequences of greater enforcement for any particular member of the class of 
beneficiaries are often unavoidably speculative" in the context of regulatory status challenges). 
But cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978) 
(stating that the Court requires plaintiffs only to show "substantial likelihood" of redressability); 
National Wildlife Fedn. v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("mere likelihood" 
sufficient). 
86. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975). 
87. 422 U.S. at 505. 
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where plaintiffs assert harm caused by injuries from third parties' 
favorable status under federal regulations. 
Courts have granted standing in challenges to a variety of regula-
tions where third parties caused plaintiffs' injuries, inclucl4ig nearly all 
of the competitor standing cases. 88 Other plaintiffs have shown indi-
rect harms sufficient to support standing by alleging that federal fuel 
efficiency standards diminished their consumer options, 89 and that fed-
eral orders or regulations degraded the environment, thereby dimin-
ishing plaintiffs' demonstrated personal enjoyment of the outdoors.90 
Although these cases required courts to accept at least two-staged 
causal relationships, some of them quite tenuous,91 the courts obliged 
wherever they found logical connections between regulations and inju-
rious acts. 
Courts have repeatedly refused to grant standing in cases challeng-
ing third parties' tax exemptions. But the Supreme Court has never 
categorically prohibited such challenges. IQ.stead, the specific facts of 
the tax-status challenges have failed to support standing because plain-
tiffs have failed to prove either sufficient injuries-in-fact or traceability 
and redressability. Plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright failed to allege suffi-
cient injuries-in-fact based on the "mere fact" of the government's fail-
ure to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private 
schools.92 Absence of sufficient injury-in-fact defeated an industry 
group's allegation of vague harm from the government's failure to tax 
nonprofit organizations' supposedly competitive income.93 It also pre-
cluded, in Khalaf v. Regan,94 challenges to the tax-exempt status of 
pro-Israel organizations by certain pro-Palestinian plaintiffs whose 
claimed harms amounted only to the undesirable observation of poll-
88. See, e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (plaintiffs challenged 
administrative ruling to redress alleged competitive disadvantage from applicant for ruling); As-
sociation of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (plaintiffs challenged 
banking regulation to redress alleged competitive disadvantage from banks). See supra notes 46-
66 and accompanying text. 
89. See Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 
113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 
F.2d 1322, 1334-35 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
90. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 688 (1973); National Wildlife Fedn. v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
91. See, e.g., SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688 (describing the injury at issue as involving "a far more 
attenuated line of causation" than in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the 
Court denied standing). 
92. 468 U.S. 737, 753-56 (1984). 
93. American Socy. of Travel Agents v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(challenging failure to assess taxes only for particular types of income; plaintiffs failed to show 
that failure to assess taxes injured their profits), cert. denied; 435 U.S. 947 (1978). The extent to 
which the Travel Agents court's traceability/redressability analysis is bound up with its injury-in-
fact analysis demonstrates powerfully that plaintiffs must plead credible injuries-in-fact in order 
to satisfy the remaining prongs of the constitutional test. 
94. 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9269 (D.D.C. 1985). 
852 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:838 
cies with which they disagreed.95 
Overly attenuated traceability and redressability arguments were 
fatal to plaintiffs' claim in Allen that the government's failure to deny 
tax exemptions somehow hindered plaintiffs' children's chances to re-
ceive integrated education by facilitating development of segregated 
schools.96 Similarly, indigent plaintiffs in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization 91 failed to demonstrate that a revenue 
ruling granting favorable tax status to hospitals providing limited indi-
gent services actually caused their inability to secure medical care.98 
It also precluded standing for Palestinian plaintiffs in Khalaf who 
claimed that the tax exemptions they sought to challenge had caused 
confiscation of their property in the Occupied Territories.99 
The cases denying standing to tax-exemption challenges confirm 
that a claim of indirect harm requires a solidly defined injury-in-fact 
and a logically consistent line of causation. Each challenge discussed 
fell short of one or both of these standards. The courts have never 
indicated that they would deny standing for a better-stated challenge 
to a third party's tax exemption; they have granted standing in numer-
ous and varied cases involving challenges to third-party status under 
other federal regulations. 
C. Prudential Limitations on Standing 
In addition to the constitutional tests for standing, the Supreme 
Court has developed a number of "prudential" limitations to ensure 
judicial self-restraint. The Court has described these limitations as 
"closely related to Art[icle] III concerns but essentially matters of ju-
dicial self-govemance."100 Unlike the constitutional standing tests, 
the prudential requirements are subject to elimination for any given 
95. 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 9269. Mere observation of conduct with which one dis-
agrees cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
96. Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-79. 
97. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
98. Simon. 426 U.S. at 41-43. It is significant that the plaintiffs in Simon charged only that 
the revenue ruling at issue "had 'encouraged' hospitals to deny services to indigents." 426 U.S. 
at 42 (quoting petitioners' complaint). Plaintiffs thus made no attempt to demonstrate that their 
claimed injuries would not have occurred, or would have been less likely to have occurred, with-
out the government's allegedly illegal ruling. 
99. 85-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 9269 (plaintiffs failed to show how U.S. government's grant 
of tax exemptions led to Israeli government's subsequent seizures of property). 
100. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). See Floyd, supra note 42, at 889-90 (sug-
gesting that the prudential zone of interests requirement must be seen as "basic and fundamen-
tal"). But cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (stating that "the counsels of prudence ... should [not] be 
mistaken for the rigorous Art. III requirements themselves"); International Assn. of Machinists 
& Aerospace Workers v. Federal Election Commn., 678 F.2d 1092, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stat-
ing that prudential rule against assertion of third parties' rights "is not of constitutional dimen-
sion"), ajfd., 459 U.S. 983 (1982). 
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class of plaintiffs.101 
The most ubiquitous prudential limitation is that a plaintiff claim-
ing a right under a regulation must stand within the "zone of inter-
ests" which Congress intended the attendant statute to protect.102 
Although the zone of interests test does not demand an actual showing 
of Congressional purpose, the Court uses the test to decide whether 
particular plaintiffs are appropriate parties to challenge regulations 
under the "evident intent [of Congress] to make agency action pre-
sumptively reviewable."103 This requirement occasionally precludes 
standing for plaintiffs who have shown cognizable injuries-in-fact to 
challenge statutes or regulations.104 But in general, the zone of in-
terests test is relatively kind to plaintiffs.105 The standard shares with 
the Court's constitutional standing criteria a tendency toward 
ambiguity .106 
The Court has articulated two other prudential limitations, both of 
which are subject to exceptions in particular cases. The Court usually 
denies standing when plaintiffs plead "generalized grievance[s] shared 
in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens."107 
The Court also generally refuses to hear claims in which plaintiffs as-
sert the rights of third parties rather than their own rights.108 The 
101. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
102. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970); 
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163-65 (1970). 
103. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). 
104. See, e.g., Jet Courier Servs. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 
1983) (denying standing to plaintiffs, who had satisfied constitutional standing requirements, be-
cause of lack of congressional intent to protect plaintiffs' interest in banking act giving rise to 
challenge); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 143-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(denying standing for plaintiff nonprofit organization to pursue cognizable injury where court 
found purpose of statute not to have included protection of plaintiffs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 
(1978). 
105. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 403 (finding plaintiff within statute's zone of interest upon show-
ing of "plausible relationship" between plaintiff's interest and policy underlying statute); see also 
Tax Analysts, 566 F.2d at 142 (describing "generous nature" of zone of interests test). 
106. See Tax Analysts, 566 F.2d at 138-39 (strongly criticizing zone of interests test as 
"deficien[t], ambigu[ous]," "confusi[ng]," and "imprecise"). The Supreme Court itself has ac-
knowledged criticism of the test and conceded that the test "has not proved self-explanatory." 
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396 & n.11. 
On the other hand, some scholars have called for greater emphasis on the zone of interests 
test in standing decisions to counter the difficulties they recognize in applying the constitutional 
requirements. See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 42, at 889-91. 
107. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). But cf. United States v. Students Challeng-
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (granting standing based 
upon alleged environmental harms which affected "all persons who utilize the scenic resources of 
the country, and indeed all who breathe its air''). 
108. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500 (1975); see 422 U.S. at 509-10 (denying standing for plaintiff 
taxpayers to challenge zoning ordinance which allegedly denied housing to people with low in-
comes). The Court may permit assertion of third parties' rights where plaintiffs plead conse-
quences to third parties of allegedly illegal enforcement of regulations against plaintiffs. 422 U.S. 
at 510. Other factors entering into the disposition of "third party standing" claims are the rela-
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Court views both of these limitations, like the zone of interests test, as 
protecting courts from the need to decide "abstract questions of wide 
public significance" which other branches of government might more 
appropriately address.109 
Although the prudential limitations may affect standing determi-
nations for challenges to the regulatory status of third parties110 and 
claims of competitor standing111 in general, they should not bar chal-
lenges raised against third parties' tax exemptions. The Supreme 
Court has limited its standing analysis of such challenges to the consti-
tutional requirements even where plaintiffs did not assert underlying 
constitutional rights. 112 Moreover, little possibility exists that plain-
tiffs asserting cognizable harms to challenge third-parties' tax exemp-
tions would fall outside the zone of interests of section 50l(c)(3); when 
Congress passes a statute barring tax-exempt organizations from cer-
tain activities, it protects competitors or others who would suffer if 
those organizations participated in the specified activities. With 
neither of the other prudential limitations apposite, third-party tax sta-
tus challenges appear safe from whatever confusion the limitations 
have fostered. 
The Supreme Court's standing doctrine demonstrates that Lenora 
Fulani has raised a viable challenge to debate sponsors' tax exemp-
tions. The Court has acknowledged that injuries to competitive capac-
ities satisfy its injury-in-fact standard. Once a plaintiff has alleged a 
significant injury, he must simply show a sufficient causal relationship 
between his injuries and the challenged conduct to fulfill the traceabil-
ity and redressability requirements and establish constitutional stand-
ing. Numerous plaintiffs challenging regulatory treatment of third 
parties have shown such causal connections, despite the indirect na-
ture of their injuries. For a challenge like Fulani's, the added standing 
burdens of the prudential limitations are not a concern. An analysis of 
tionship between plaintiff and the third party and the ease with which the third party could assert 
her own rights. See Fletcher, supra note 42, at 246. For criticisms of the third party standing 
doctrine as a largely artificial division which should give way to a zone of interests approach, see 
id. at 245-47; Floyd, supra note 42, at 900-02. 
109. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. While Warth clearly identifies an important separation of pow· 
ers rationale in the Court's prudential restraints, see 422 U.S. at 499-500, it does not appear to 
have contemplated the dominant position to which Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), has 
elevated federalism concerns in standing analysis. See infra section III.A. 
110. See, e.g., Humane Socy. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (zone of interests 
test applied); Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 
1335 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (generalized grievance test applied). 
111. See, e.g., Clarke, 419 U.S. at 401-03 (zone of interests test applied). 
112. See Allen, 468 U.S. 737; see also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 
(1976) (no prudential analysis of challenge to revenue ruling under § 501(c)(3) benefiting third 
party). The D.C. Circuit has similarly foregone prudential analysis in a case challenging failure 
to tax certain specific income of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations. See American Socy. of 
Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947 
(1978). 
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Fulani's challenges in the Second and D.C. Circuits will demonstrate 
that a correct reading of the Court's standing doctrine supports stand-
ing in this case. 
II. THE SECOND Cmcurr-D.C. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
This Part compares the Second Circuit's113 and District of Colum-
bia Circuit's114 divergent decisions about minor-party candidates' 
standing to challenge debate sponsors' tax exemptions in Lenora Fu-
lani's cases and concludes that the Second Circuit's arguments sup-
porting standing are more persuasive. Section II.A finds that the 
Second Circuit's opinion, along with Chief Judge Mikva's dissent in 
the D.C. Circuit, appraised Fulani's injuries more thoroughly and ac-
curately than did the D.C. Circuit, and concludes that those injuries 
weigh strongly in favor of standing. Section II.B rejects the D.C. Cir-
cuit's key arguments against traceability and redressability in favor of 
the Second Circuit's more accurate application of relevant Supreme 
Court precedents and characterization of causal factors in Fulani's 
claim. While acknowledging the relative uncertainty of the two causal 
prongs, this section concludes that Fulani's showing should have been 
sufficient to withstand the D.C. Circuit's denial. Section II.C confirms 
that the irrelevance of prudential standing limitations to Fulani's 
claims precludes the statutory attack on Fulani's standing arguments 
which the D.C. Circuit suggests. This analysis demonstrates that a 
candidate should have standing to challenge debate sponsors' tax 
status. 
A. Injury in Fact 
1. The Second Circuit Analysis 
The key to the Second Circuit's grant of standing in Fulani v. 
League of Women Voters 115 was its thorough characterization of 
plaintiff Fulani's injuries. The court understood that minor-party·can-
didacies serve multiple societal goals and that degrees of exposure and 
113. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). 
114. Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
115. In addition to candichte Fiilani herself, plaintiffs in both League and Brady included 
Fulani's campaign committee and a supporter. League, 882 F.2d at 621; Brady, 935 F.2d at 1331 
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting). Unless otherwise noted, this Note will treat Fulani alone as the plain-
tiff in these cases. Defendants in each case included the current debate sponsor as well as the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. League, 882 F.2d at 621; 
Brady, 935 F.2d at 1324. Fulani apparently included the League as a defendant in the first action 
in a failed attempt to challenge its actions directly. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters 
Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). She initially sued the Commission on 
Presidential Debates in the second case but dropped her claims against the Commission at the 
district court level; the Commission subsequently reentered the fray as intervenor. See Fulani v. 
Brady, 729 F. Supp. 158, 160 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1990). This Note focuses on the government de-
fendants as the adversaries to Fulani's tax-status challenge, although the organizational defend-
ants' arguments presumably figured prominently in both the Second and D.C. Circuits' decisions. 
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success in elections may greatly influence progress toward those goals. 
These insights prompted the court to emphasize both the breadth and 
the depth of Fulani's alleged injuries. 
Fulani's alleged injuries were broad because the challenged con-
duct harmed important goals other than actually winning the presi-
dency. The court characterized Fulani's lost "opportunity to 
communicate her political ideas to the electorate on equal terms with 
other significant presidential candidates" as an injury distinct from her 
loss of competitive advantage in the election per se.116 By separating 
these factors, the court acknowledged that political communication 
serves a variety of advocacy goals beyond the bottom line of victory. 
Chief Judge Mikva, dissenting from the D.C. Circuit's decision in Fu-
lani v. Brady, elaborated on this theme when he noted Fulani's "credi-
bility as a 'spoiler' and public advocate."117 His dissent also 
emphasized that Fulani's status as a woman of color would likely have 
enhanced her importance as a spoiler.11s 
Fulani's alleged injuries from defendants' acts were also substan-
tial. She asserted that participation in televised debates provided a 
critical source of the mass exposure upon which campaigns depend for 
legitimacy.119 The Second Circuit stressed "the powerful beneficial ef-
fect that mass media exposure can have today on the candidacy of a 
significant aspirant seeking national political office" and firmly con-
cluded that debate participants improved their competitive positions 
over nonparticipants.120 The court's recognition of the depth of Fu-
lani's alleged injuries gains force from its comprehension of their 
breadth, because Fulani's exclusion from televised debates arguably 
affected all of her goals as a candidate. 
Fulani's alleged injuries in both League and Brady arose under the 
Internal Revenue Code, 121 but they also embraced underlying consti-
116. 882 F.2d at 625-26; see also Common Cause v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 26, 30 (D.D.C. 
1980), (holding that candidates' alleged injuries from abuses of Congressional franking privileges 
occurred regardless of outcomes of elections). 
117. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1332 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting); see also Chandler v. Georgia Pub. 
Telecommunications Commn., 749 F. Supp. 264, 268-69 (N.D. Ga. 1990), m•d., 917 F.2d 486 
(11th Cir. 1990) (arguing for inclusion of minor-party candidate in gubernatorial debate despite 
his advocacy of an "admitted[] ••• minority point of view"). 
118. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1332 (quoting affidavit of Fred Newman, Fulani's campaign 
manager). 
119. For an elaboration of support for this view in the political science literature, see Infra 
section III.B. 
120. League, 882 F.2d at 626. The D.C. Circuit had previously expressed the same view. 
See Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (admitting that exclusion from 
televised debates "removes ••. one of the great number of avenues for candidates to gain public-
ity and credibility with the citizenry" and that "[petitioners'] inclusion in the televised debates 
undoubtedly would have benefitted their campaign"). Johnson conceded these points despite its 
conclusory skepticism about the relative importance of debates: the court rejected plaintiff mi-
nor-party candidates' appeal of defendant agency's refusal to prohibit televising of a debate from 
which the debate sponsors had excluded plaintiffs. 
121. See League, 882 F.2d at 623-624; Brady, 935 F.2d at 1329. 
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tutional claims.122 Fulani argued that her exclusion-from the debates 
violated her First Amendment right to free expression by denying an 
opportunity to communicate her political message in the same manner 
as other legitimate presidential candidates; the Brady dissent found 
that Fulani's claim "suggests restriction of 'classically political speech' 
and so goes to the core of the First Amendment."123 She also alleged 
that the exclusion violated her equal protection rights because of her 
race and gender.124 Other candidate plaintiffs have met with mixed 
success raising First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in challenges 
to other exclusionary electoral procedures.125 But the fact that neither 
the Second nor the D.C. Circuit challenged Fulani's constitutional ba-
ses confirms the constitutional tenor of Fulani's alleged injuries. Seen 
in both their statutory and constitutional dimensions, Fulani's alleged 
122. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988), ajfd., 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). The district court in League dismissed Fulani's direct 
constitutional claims against the League for lack of state action, see 684 F. Supp. at 1192, but this 
disposition did not speak to the constitutional character of Fulani's challenge to the League's tax 
exemption. 
123. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1333 (Miltva, C.J., dissenting). The dissent correctly pointed out 
that the court "d[id] not dispute the constitutional sufficiency of Fulani's alleged injury." 935 
F.2d at 1332 (Miltva, CJ., dissenting). The court did, however, take a backhand swipe at Fu-
lani's First Amendment theory by citing Justice Stewart's concurrence in Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring), to the effect that he could 
not imagine an appropriate context for a third-party tax-status challenge "outside the First 
Amendment area." The court, while conceding that the concurrence lacked precedential force, 
suggested that Justice Stewart had meant to refer only to the First Amendment's religion clauses, 
precluding such a challenge based upon free speech rights. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1326-27 & n.2. 
But the dissent used Supreme Court precedents of the time to demonstrate that Justice Stewart's 
statement, whatever its precedential value, made far more sense in a speech than a religion con-
text. 935 F.2d at 1333 (Miltva, C.J., dissenting). 
124. See League, 684 F. Supp. at 1186. Fulani's equal protection claims presumably rested 
on the historic underrepresentation of women and people of color among major-party candidates 
for national office and the resultant reliance of many members of those groups on minor parties 
for participation in national elections. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see infra note 224 
and accompanying text; see generally SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 30. 
125. The Supreme Court overruled a state's early filing deadline for minor-party candidates 
on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
The Second Circuit in League stressed Anderson's relevance to Fulani's situation. See League, 
882 F.2d at 626. But the D.C. Circuit has held that debate participation affected candidates' 
fortunes significantly less than ballot access and therefore did not implicate the Constitution. 
Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit rejected 
First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the failure of a public television station to in-
clude third-party candidates in televised debates. Chandler v. Georgia Pub. Telecommunications 
Commn., 917 F.2d 486, 488-89 (11th Cir. 1990). 
But in neither of these decisions did plaintiffs offer constitutional arguments as compelling as 
Fulani's. Plaintiffs in Chandler apparently did not base their First Amendment claim on the 
special constitutional status of political speech but simply made a more general "marketplace of 
ideas" argument. See 917 F.2d at 488-89. The D.C. Circuit in Johnson did recognize safeguard-
ing the integrity of the electoral process as "a fundamental task of the Constitution," 829 F.2d at 
164, but plaintiffs in that case apparently argued only that debate restrictions abridged their free 
speech rights by hurting their chances at victory; they did not contend more broadly that the 
court should consider their rights to voice their ideas in the political discourse. See 829 F.2d at 
164. Moreover, Fulani's status as a woman of color gave her an intrinsically more compelling 
equal protection claim than plaintiffs in Chandler could present. See 917 F.2d at 489. Finally, 
both Chandler and Johnson went to the merits rather than to standing. 
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injuries gave the,Second Circuit a formidable basis on which to find 
standing. 
2. The D. C. Circuit Approach 
The D.C. Circuit's analysis of Fulani's alleged injuries was virtu-
ally nonexistent. Contrary to traditional standing analysis, the court 
did not move methodically through the three prongs of the constitu-
tional test and did not attempt to examine Fulani's alleged injuries 
through the prism of the challenged conduct. Prior to its discussion of 
the causation prongs, the court instead raised miscellaneous objections 
to standing126 and broadly criticized the application of competitor 
standing to the facts of Fulani's case.127 The court's vague treatment 
of the injury prong simplified its characterization of Fulani's injuries 
as not traceable to the challenged conduct or redressable by the re-
quested relief. 128 
The court avoided an open attack on Fulani's chosen injury, per-
haps aware of the district court's and the Second Circuit concurrence's 
problematic attempts to characterize Fulani's injury narrowly. The 
Second Circuit concurrence purported to accept arguendo that Fulani 
had suffered a judicially cognizable injury129 but characterized Fu-
lani's injury at a critical point in its traceability analysis as the voters' 
"rejection of her candidacy."130 By limiting Fulani's injury to her ac-
tual inability to gamer votes, the court completely discounted her in-
dependent interest in circulating her views and thus unfairly 
diminished the connection between her injuries and the challenged tax 
exemption. 
The district court in Brady showed even less regard for Fulani's 
alleged injuries. The court first attempted to conflate Fulani's loss of 
political legitimacy from nonparticipation in the debates with her sup-
posed frustration at the advancement of an adverse political agenda. 131 
The latter injury would probably not have supported standing, 132 but 
126. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1326-27. The court's strategies included an invocation of Justice 
Stewart's concurrence in Simon, 426 U.S. at 46, and its attempt to create a statutory bar to 
standing. See infra section 11.C. 
127. See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1327-28. Without providing any clear-cut analysis, the court 
suggested that competitor standing did not apply to third-party challenges to regulatory action. 
The court, again without firm analysis, argued that a plaintiff might only challenge the govern-
ment's preferential tax treatment of a third party based upon the plaintiff's own unlawfully bur-
densome tax liability. It implied that the existence of case law supporting such direct tax 
challenges precluded Fulani's theory in the wholly distinct area of indirect injury from a third 
party's tax exemption. See 935 F.2d at 1328. 
128. 935 F.2d at 1332-33 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (referring to "[t]he majority's failure to 
come to terms with Fulani's injury"). See infra section 11.B.2. 
129. See League, 882 F.2d at 630 (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
130. 882 F.2d at 632 (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
131. See Fulani v. Brady, 729 F. Supp. 158, 161 (D.D.C. 1990). 
132. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984) (denying standing where Court 
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it bore no relationship to the denial of political legitimacy which Fu-
lani had actually alleged. The court rejected "any notion that Fulani 
has suffered a cognizable injury based upon any alleged lack of recog-
nition or diminution of her political stature," judging itself incapable 
of analyzing such concepts.133 This sweeping dismissal shortchanged 
Fulani's injuries so dramatically that the court could deny traceability 
and redressability with deceptive ease. Indeed, the court admitted that 
its injury analysis laid the groundwork for its causation discussion, 134 
and it actually spent the latter half of its purported injury analysis 
attacking Fulani's causation theories. 135 
The implausibility of these prior attempts to understate Fulani's 
alleged injuries clearly weakened the credibility of the Second Circuit 
concurrence's and the district court's attendant traceability and 
redressability analyses. The D.C. Circuit cleverly dodged the same 
trap, but its almost total failure to analyze Fulani's injury betrayed its 
strategy. If the court had recognized the breadth and depth of the 
injuries alleged, as had the Second Circuit, the plausibility of denying 
those injuries' traceability to the challenged conduct and their redres-
sability through the requested relief would have severely diminished. 
B. Traceability and Redressability 
1. The Second Circuit Analysis 
The Second Circuit concluded that it could fairly trace Fulani's 
injuries to the League's tax exemption. The court explicitly rejected 
the notion that Fulani's injuries "derive[d] solely from the fact that 
she ultimately failed to win the presidency in 1988," emphasizing de-
fendants' "allegedly partisan restriction of her opportunities to com-
municate her political ideas to the voting public at large."136 The 
court traced this broad injury to Fulani's exclusion from the debates. 
Because of the regulatory requirement that debate sponsors be tax ex-
empt, 137 the tax exemption that the government granted to the League 
caused the exclusion. 
found that plaintiffs' claims rested on objections to racial stigmatization but challenged conduct 
had not harmed plaintiffs themselves). 
133. Brady, 129 F. Supp. at 162. The court proceeded to downplay Fulani's claim because, 
in its estimation, the major-party candidates prior to the debates already had the "realistic 
chance of winning the election and ..• competitive advantage" which Fulani sought. 729 F. 
Supp. at 162. Aside from this argument's circularity - denial of previous media exposure could 
not injure Fulani's political legitimacy because her 1ack of media exposure had prevented her 
from gaining political legitimacy - it presumes the vecy sort of analytic insight into the nature of 
political legitimacy which the court had just abjured. 
134. See 129 F. Supp. at 162. 
135. See 129 F. Supp. at 162-63 & n.8. The court denied the value of televised debates for 
competitive advantage and stressed the possible behavior which various parties might use to 
circumvent the requested relief, all within its purported injury-in-fact analysis. 
136. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 627 (2d Cir. 1989). 
137. See 882 F.2d at 627-28. 
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In discussing traceability, the court compared Fulani's claims to 
the situation in Common Cause v. Bolger. 138 In that case, candidates 
and prospective candidates for Congress challenged portions of the 
Congressional franking statute which subsidized incumbents' political 
mailings. They claimed injuries to their ability to compete politically, 
alleging that the statute illegally aided reelection of incumbents. 139 
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing, ruling inter alia that plaintiffs' alleged injuries were directly 
traceable to the statute's operation.140 
The Second Circuit found Bolger strikingly similar to the circum-
stances in League. The court stressed the earlier decision's expansive 
view of candidates' interests arising out of elections.141 Bolger also 
paralleled the degree of attenuation between Fulani's injuries and the 
conduct she challenged; the court rejected defendants' invocations of 
cases involving more attenuated injuries.142 Like Fulani, the plaintiffs 
in Bolger had actually competed, or clearly intended to compete immi-
nently, in the election which gave rise to their challenge and had ex-
plained the particular mechanism by which the challenged 
government action had injured their ability to compete.143 
The Second Circuit found no impediment to traceability in the 
high Court's admonition that an injury does not fail the traceability 
test merely because it is indirect.144 The court correctly concluded 
that the decisions in Allen and Simon had not precluded finding trace-
ability for a third-party tax-status challenge. Those cases had merely 
confirmed the requirement of a "nexus" between the challenged con-
duct and the alleged injury; the court found that the FEC regulation 
mandating tax-exempt debate sponsors created just such a nexus in 
League. 145 The Brady dissent extended this analysis, distinguishing 
both Allen and Simon. Allen, the dissent said, had involved unpredict-
able decisions of multiple third parties with critical impacts on plain-
tiffs' alleged injuries. In Simon, the plaintiffs' injuries might arguably 
have arisen without the challenged revenue ruling. 146 The tax exemp-
tion which Fulani challenged, in contrast, directly caused the injuries 
arising out of her exclusion from the debates. 147 
138. 512 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1980), ajfd., 461 U.S. 911 (1983). 
139. 512 F. Supp. at 28. Plaintiffs' claims rested on underlying First and Fifth Amendment 
injuries. 
140. 512 F. Supp. at 30-31. 
141. League, 882 F.2d at 627. 
142. 882 F.2d at 627. 
143. See Bolger, 512 F. Supp. at 28. 
144. League, 882 F.2d at 627; see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
145. 882 F.2d at 627-28. For a discussion of the significance of federal cases denying stand-
ing for third-party tax-status challenges, see supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
146. See Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
147. See League, 882 F.2d at 627-28. Fulani claimed only injuries which arose directly out 
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The Second Circuit used a similar analysis to conclude that the 
requested relief could adequately redress Fulani's injuries. Because 
revocation of the League's tax exemption would prevent the League's 
sponsorship of the debates, revocation would also prevent Fulani's in-
juries.148 The court rejected the proposition that it had to repair all 
inequities in competition among the candidates in order successfully to 
redress Fulani's injuries: "a substantial likelihood that the relief re-
quested will have a substantial ameliorative effect on the specific injury 
alleged" would suffice.149 The D.C. Circuit dissent in Brady bolsters 
the Second Circuit's persuasive redressability arguments. Responding 
to the majority's speculation about the behavior of particular "inter-
vening actors,"150 the dissent concluded that redress of Fulani's inju-
ries did not require the court to guarantee Fulani some set quantity of 
media exposure but simply to prevent "the prejudice to her candidacy 
that would inevitably result from a one-on-one debate between [the] 
rival candidates."151 
The two causation prongs, traceability and redressability, might 
seem to pose the greatest challenge to standing, simply because they 
require arguments about degrees of causal attenuation that cannot 
produce absolute answers. This difficulty appears especially acute in 
the redressability inquiry, which seeks to determine the concreteness 
of the requested relief. But the traceability and redressability inquiries 
necessarily merge in cases such as these, where plaintiffs allege future 
injuries from challenged agency actions152 and request mere cessation 
of illegal conduct.153 Fulani's injuries satisfy both requirements. 
2. The D. C. Circuit Analysis 
The D.C. Circuit held that Fulani's injuries failed the traceability 
and redressability tests. The court's central theory was that, in a 
third-party tax-status challenge, "the exemption likely will not bear 
sufficient links of traceability and redressability to the alleged injury to 
warrant standing under Allen .•.. " 154 Having thus revealed the un-
of her debate exclusion, for which the League's tax-exempt status was a necessary condition. Her 
case therefore diverged starkly from Simon, in which plaintiffs had claimed injuries from hospi-
tals' policies which they had not shown necessarily to have arisen out of the challenged govern-
ment conduct. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976). 
148. See 882 F.2d at 628. 
149. 882 F.2d at 628 n.6 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984), and Simon, 
426 U.S. at 45-46). 
150. See infra section 11.B.2. 
151. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1335 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
152. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The injuries that Fulani alleged, although 
already having occurred in the context of the 1988 primaries at the time of League, would pre-
sumably recur in the general election, as in fact they did; at the time of Brady, they would 
presumably recur in future election cycles. 
153. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
154. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1328 (emphasis added). 
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certain foundation of its argument, the court struggled to demonstrate 
that its narrow conception of Fulani's injuries bore an insufficient rela-
tionship to the CPD's tax exemption to support standing. 
The court denied traceability and redressability because of the crit-
ical role played by intervening actors in the chain of causation. The 
court first examined the FEC regulation requiring tax exemption for 
debate sponsorship. While conceding that "CPD's tax exemption is a 
cause-in-fact of [Fulani's] injury,"155 the court characterized the regu-
lation as an intervening cause because it created the essential relation-
ship between the tax status and the injury.156 The court proposed that 
Fulani should have sought relief based upon the regulation itself, cit-
ing an attendant FEC regulation providing administrative review for 
"violation[s] of any statute or regulation over which the Commission 
has jurisdiction."157 But Fulani had no cause to complain of any vio-
lation of section 110.13(a), because that regulation merely applied 
mechanically to her circumstances. Only the grant of tax exemption 
arguably involved an unlawful abuse of discretion, making that action 
the proper target for Fulani's challenge. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit 
suggested no administrative adjudication that could have encompassed 
Fulani's constitutional complaints. 
Two other flaws mar the court's argument that the FEC regulation 
intervened between the debate sponsor's tax exemption and Fulani's 
alleged injuries. First, the regulation did not "intervene" in the fact 
pattern which culminated in Fulani's alleged injuries; rather, it existed 
as a concurrent condition for televised debates to take place. Second, 
to characterize federal regulations generally as "intervening causes" of 
injuries that actually result from actions they authorize would involve 
unreasonable speculation. The dissent attacked the court's argument 
on this basis, pointing out the absurd result that "the majority's ap-
proach would preclude any suit to force compliance with a statute or 
administrative regulation."15s 
The court next suggested that the debate sponsors and the major-
party candidates intervened in the causal chain linking the grant of tax 
exemption to Fulani's injuries. It speculated that the CPD might de-
cline to sponsor televised presidential debates if the government tried 
155. 935 F.2d at 1329. This significant concession undermines the court's conclusion. The 
Supreme Court has never gone so far as to suggest that an injury cannot be fairly traced to its 
cause·in-fact. Indeed, the Court has recognized that a showing of "but for'' causation satisfies 
the traceability requirement. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 
74-75 (1978). 
156. 935 F.2d at 1329. 
157. 11C.F.R.§111.4(a) (1990). 
158. 935 F.2d at 1335 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court had previously rejected 
the argument that speculation about the hypothetical absence of a government enactment could 
defeat traceability. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 77-78 (holding that plaintiff did not have to 
answer defendant's speculation that plaintiff's injury might have happened even absent a chal-
lenged statute). 
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to affect its behavior by revoking its tax exemption, or that if the CPD 
altered its standards to include minor-party candidates, the major-
party candidates might refuse to participate.159 The court concluded 
that these possibilities defeated redressability because either would 
have prevented Fulani from improving her competitive position.160 
But this conclusion depends on the court's artificially restrictive con-
ception of Fulani's injuries. Fully understood, her injuries included 
diminution of her roles as advocate and spoiler; even the results that 
the court hypothesized would have helped her in those capacities.161 
In general, the court ignored the settled principle that indirectness 
of an injury does not necessarily preclude traceability and redres-
sability.162 None of the court's proposed "intervening causal actors" 
altered the fact that Fulani's alleged injuries could not have occurred 
without the government's grant of tax exemption to the CPD and that 
her position as a candidate would have improved were the exemption 
revoked.163 The court might conceivably have contended that the de-
gree of intervening causation rendered Fulani's causal chain too atten-
uated to support a finding of traceability, but its categorical argument 
that intervening actors necessarily broke the chain lacked merit. 
Precedent helped neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Second Circuit 
concurrence in League to discredit Fulani's showings of traceability 
and redressability. The D.C. Circuit invoked Warth v. Seldin, 164 Allen 
v. Wright, 165 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion 166 to support its assertion that "intervening actors" defeated cau-
sation. But the court merely recited each case's facts and pointed out 
that the Supreme Court had denied standing based upon causal defi-
ciencies in all three.167 It never defined any similarity between those 
cases' causal problems and Fulani's situation.168 The Second Circuit 
159: 935 F.2d at 1329; see also Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 
621, 632 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
160. 935 F.2d at 1329; (citing League, 882 F.2d at 632 (Cardamone, J., concurring)). 
161. The court's arguments about the debate sponsors and major-party candidates suffer not 
only from deficient accounting of Fulani's injuries, but also from failure to acknowledge the 
critical role which debates play in creating the gap between major-party and minor-party candi-
dates. Fulani would have certainly preferred no debates to the status quo, because debates confer 
legitimacy and provide exposure which are currently restricted to the major parties. See infra 
section III.C.2. 
162. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
163. The Brady dissent stated that the court's categorical argument against causation based 
on the existence of intervening actors "is not, and has never been, the law." 935 F.2d at 1333 
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that the intervening forces discussed by the 
majority did not so attenuate Fulani's chain of causation as to preclude redress of her alleged 
injuries. 935 F.2d at 1334-35 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
164. 422 U.S. 490 (1975); see Brady, 935 F.2d at 1329-30. 
165. 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see Brady, 935 F.2d at 1330. 
166. 426 U.S. 26 (1976); see Brady, 935 F.2d at 1330. 
167. See 935 F.2d at 1329-30. 
168. The court merely characterized the causal deficiencies in Simon and Allen as involving 
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concurrence in League countered the majority's use of Bolger by in-
voking Winpisinger v. Watson, 169 in which the D.C. Circuit denied 
standing to a presidential candidate's supporters who challenged cer-
tain actions of the incumbent President that they alleged unlawfully 
aided his renomination.17° But plaintiffs in Winpisinger had not them-
selves competed in the election at issue.171 This factor clearly distin-
guishes Winpisinger from the Fulani cases, as the D.C. Circuit, which 
placed no weight on Winpisinger, apparently realized. 
The Second Circuit concurrence in League offered two additional 
rationales for its conclusion that Fulani's injuries failed the causation 
tests. First, the concurrence contended that Fulani could not trace her 
injuries to the challenged conduct because she had not actually com-
peted with the recipient of the challenged tax exemption.172 This is an 
overly rigid argument: the Supreme Court's competitor standing cases 
have never suggested that an additional, clear causal link - in this 
case, the League's provision of legitimacy and publicity to the major 
party candidates - would adversely affect plaintiffs' traceability and 
redressability showings.173 Second, the concurrence asserted that the 
challenged grant of tax exemption merely allowed rather than caused 
Fulani's alleged injuries. 174 This distinction lacks substance in light of 
"intervening factors." It failed to relate these factors to purported deficiencies in Fulani's case, 
instead rehashing its speculation about possible behaviors of the major-party candidates and the 
CPD. See 935 F.2d at 1330. The court undermined its reliance on Simon by conceding that "the 
CPD may sponsor the presidential debates only if it receives tax-exempt status from the IRS and 
is therefore not free, as were the hospitals in Simon, to continue its activities as a profit-funded 
organization." 935 F.2d at 1330. 
The court implied that Warth's decision, denying standing despite some presumed causal 
effect of the challenged conduct on the alleged injury, supported a denial of standing for Fulani. 
See 935 F.2d at 1329. But the court erroneously attributed Warth's discounting of the presumed 
causation entirely to causal deficiencies; in fact, plaintiffs in Warth failed to show that the chal-
lenged conduct would have injured them personally. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 502-04. 
169. 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). 
170. 628 F.2d at 138-39. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 
631 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
171. See 628 F.2d at 138-39. 
172. See League, 882 F.2d at 631 (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
173. Judge Cardamone made the same argument for the Second Circuit majority in In re 
United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1029-30 (2d Cir. 1989), cerl denied sub nom. 
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). 
The distinction between the two cases demonstrates the argument's inapplicability to League. In 
Catholic Conference, the court denied standing for pro-choice advocates to challenge the tax-
exempt status of the Catholic Church. Judge Cardamone rejected plaintiffs' competitor standing 
theory primarily because "by their own admission [plaintiffs] chose not to match the Church's 
alleged electioneering with their own." 885 F.2d at 1029. Thus Catholic Conference involved 
inadequate pleading of any relevant competitor status. The additional causal link in League -
the indirect harm to Fulani through the comparatively advantageous debate exposure of the 
major-party candidates - presented no comparable obstacle to standing; Fulani was still in di-
rect competition with the immediate instruments of her injury, the major parties. See League, 
882 F.2d at 626. But see Jordana G. Schwartz, Note, Standing to Challenge Tax-Exempt Status: 
The Second Circuit's Competitive Political Advocate Theory, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 723 (1990) 
(arguing that League and Catholic Conference are incompatible and should be reconciled). 
174. League, 882 F.2d at 631 (Cardamone, J., concurring). 
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the sponsoring organization's need for tax exemption. Neither of the 
League concurrence's arguments thus overcomes Fulani's showings of 
traceability and redressability. 
The D.C. Circuit's failure to present any principle or precedent 
opposed to finding causation in Brady confirms the Second Circuit's 
conclusions that Fulani could fairly trace her injuries to the debate 
sponsoring organization's tax exemption and that the court could re-
dress those injuries by revoking the exemption. The D.C. Circuit 
could not draw Fulani's injuries narrowly enough to obscure their 
source in the challenged conduct; its attempt to drown out causation 
in a cacophony of "intervening actors" also failed. Fulani satisfied all 
three prongs of the constitutional test for standing in both League and 
Brady. 
C. Prudential Limitations 
None of the Fulani decisions explicitly discussed possible pruden-
tial barriers to standing. Neither the majority nor the concurrence in 
the Second Circuit even hinted that a candidate's challenge to a debate 
sponsor's tax exemption might involve a generalized grievance, plead-
ing of a third party's rights, or a zone of interests problem. But the 
D.C. Circuit implied that Fulani's injuries might fall outside the zone 
of interests of section 50l(c)(3).175 The court suggested that a provi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code providing a remedy for entities ag-
grieved by section 50l(c)(3) determinations176 constitutes "apparent 
congressional intent" to forbid third-party challenges to tax 
exemptions.177 
The suggestion lacks merit. The court hedged its claim, first call-
ing the provision "inconsistent with, if not preclusive of, third party 
litigation of tax-exempt status"178 but conceding that "the cited stat-
ute does not preclude expressly the possibility that a third party could 
175. See Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
176. The provision states, in relevant part: 
(a) Creation of remedy. 
In a case of actual controversy involving -
(1) a determination by the Secretary -
(A) with respect to the initial qualification or continuing qualification of an or-
ganization as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) .•• , or .•. 
(2) a failure by the Secretary to make a determination with respect to an issue referred 
to in paragraph (1), upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, the United States Tax 
Court, the United States Claims Court, or the district court of the United States for the 
District of Columbia may make a declaration with respect to such initial qualification or 
continuing qualification •.•• 
(b) Limitations. 
(1) Petitioner. 
A pleading may be filed under this section only by the organization the qualification or 
classification of which is at issue. 
26 u.s.c. § 7428 (1988). 
177. 935 F.2d at 1327. 
178. 935 F.2d at 1327. 
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file an action under some [other] statute or source of law .... " 179 In 
fact, the cited statute had nothing to do with third-party tax status 
challenges. The court triumphantly noted that the provision limits its 
remedy to would-be 50l(c)(3) recipients. "[I]t certainly is telling," the 
court concluded, "that Congress thought it necessary to create a spe-
cific remedy for the adjudication of a [section] 50l(c)(3) determination 
even on behalf of the one entity whose standing is least subject to chal-
lenge, and that Congress chose to limit the remedy to that entity."180 
But a simpler interpretation would conclude that Congress was simply 
not contemplating third-party challengers when it provided a remedy 
for applicants to challenge their own status. The court fallaciously 
conflated two qualitatively distinct types of challenges.181 
Moreover, the court's statutory digression ignored the irrelevance 
of the zone of interests requirement to third-party tax-status chal-
lenges.182 The dissent pointed out this error, stressing that the zone of 
interests test has no role in determining standing to raise constitu-
tional claims.183 The major cases denying standing for third-party tax-
status challenges have never invoked the zone of interests 
requirement.184 
Only the broad caution about intruding upon functions of the 
other branches of government might appear relevant to Fulani's 
claims.185 Although the D.C. Circuit did not raise this objection to 
standing, the Second Circuit concurrence argued that granting Fulani 
standing would compel the court "to tell the executive branch whom it 
should prosecute for tax violations; in essence, advise it how it should 
implement the laws."186 Besides wrongly implying that redressing Fu-
lani's claims would have involved a prosecution, the concurrence's ob-
jection miscalculated the impact of granting her standing on 
separation of powers grounds. Fulani's third-party strategy avoided 
the sort of direct challenge to Presidential authority which rightly con-
179. 935 F.2d at 1327. The court slid even further off its position by explicitly admitting that 
it might grant standing for this type of action: "[I]f we were to find that a case does exist in 
which one party can litigate properly the tax exemption of another, it would have to be some· 
thing far removed from the norm." 935 F.2d at 1327. The court failed to define "the norm" or 
explain how an acceptable case would have to deviate from it. 
180. 935 F.2d at 1327. 
181. The language of§ 7428 itself supports this distinction. The statute provides only for 
declaratory relief, not for the injunctive relief which was central to redress of Fulani's alleged 
injuries. 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a) (1988). 
182. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
183. 935 F.2d at 1335-36 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
184. Courts have generally rejected these challenges based upon insufficient showings of 
traceability or redressability. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
186. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(Cardamone, J., concurring). 
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cems courts.187 More broadly, Fulani did not raise technical aspects 
of taxation about which the executive boasts clear expertise but broad 
issues of social policy perfectly amenable to judicial resolution.188 
Even under Allen, Fulani's claims did not raise federalism concerns 
significant enough to justify denying standing. 
The Second Circuit properly granted Lenora Fulani standing to 
challenge the tax exemption of the organization which excluded her 
from its televised presidential debates. Analysis of the Supreme 
Court's constitutional and prudential standing tests as the Second and 
D.C. Circuits applied them to Fulani's claims permits no other conclu-
sion. In order to deny standing to a plaintiff like Fulani, a court must 
make at least one of three critical errors: underestimation of plaintiff's 
injuries; overemphasis of the importance of intervening parties; or er-
rant application of prudential limitations. The D.C. Circuit made all 
three errors and reached the wrong result. 
Strictly legal analysis is not the only path to the conclusion that 
minor-party candidates should have standing to challenge debate 
sponsors' tax exemptions. Political scientists' theories and observa-
tions about elections provide an alternative basis for standing which 
none of the Fulani decisions explore. Part III of this Note undertakes 
such an exploration. 
III. POLITICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 
This Part argues that political scientists' findings about minor-
party candidates' roles in the American electoral system bolster the 
Second Circuit's justifications for its decision to find standing, particu-
larly on the causation prongs, and help to justify candidate standing to 
challenge debate sponsors' tax status in their own right. Section III.A 
suggests that the Supreme Court's current standing jurisprudence 
leaves standing analysis open to considerations of normative policy. 
Section III.B advances the widely accepted theory that the basic struc-
ture of American elections cripples minor-party candidacies and ar-
gues that this reality compels recourse to the courts for minor-party 
candidates. Section III.C contends that the mass media's importance 
to successful political campaigns makes inclusion in televised debates a 
logical target for minor parties' court challenges. Section III.D con-
tends that even unsuccessful minor-party candidacies offer society sig-
nificant benefits and concludes that public-benefit theories of standing 
may justify standing to vindicate minor-party candidates' interests. 
187. Cf Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133, 139-41 (D.C. Cir.) (partially attributing de-
nial of standing to intrusion upon functions of executive branch which requested relief would 
have forced), cert denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). 
188. See Robert E. Atkinson, Jr., Third Parties' Tax Exempt Status Can Be Challenged Ac-
cording to New Decisions, 63 J. TAXN. 166, 169 (1985) ("Determining what kinds of activities and 
purposes promote the common benefit of society and are thus to be recognized as charitable is 
traditionally the province of the courts of equity."). 
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These arguments support Part II's conclusion that courts should hear 
minor-party candidates' challenges to debate sponsors' tax status. 
A. Lack of Clarity and Principle in the Supreme Court's Current 
Standing Doctrine 
Uncertain sources and inconsistent results mark the jurisprudence 
of standing. Lower courts and commentators regularly complain that 
the Court's standing doctrines offer "less than pellucid"189 guidance. 
From the uncertain demands of traceability and redressability to the 
slippery distinction between individualized injuries-in-fact on one 
hand and generalized grievances on the other, the Court's standing 
tests leave a wide range of fact situations open to contrary results. 
Scholars have repeatedly suggested that the Supreme Court uses its 
muddy jurisprudence of standing to mold results with an eye to the 
merits of particular claims.190 A core axiom of standing analysis is 
that courts must determine standing apart from the merits. 191 But the 
suspicion that the Supreme Court considers the merits in its standing 
decisions has become so ubiquitous that one commentator has explic-
itly urged the Court to reconceive standing as a question on the 
merits.192 
The Court's clearest injection of an extraneous consideration into 
its purportedly principled standing analysis has been its elevation of 
"separation of powers principles"193 to the pinnacle of standing juris-
prudence. Separation of powers concerns arguably have an appropri-
ate function in standing determinations as the source of the prudential 
189. Dellums v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 863 F.2d 968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also 
Doemberg, supra note 44, at 92; Fletcher, supra note 42, at 243; Winter, supra note 26, at 1373. 
But ct Floyd, supra note 42, at 869, arguing that the Burger Court did much to clarify standing 
doctrine, particularly in Warth. 
190. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article Ill: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 
93 HARV. L. REv. 1698, 1715 n.72 (1980) (Court's concept of standing "prone to manipulation 
and incoherence"); Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 40, at 637 (claiming that standing tests 
have been "raised or lowered to accommodate the various dictates of federalism, separation of 
powers, equitable restraint, and the appeal of particular claims on their merits"); Nichol, Re-
thinking Standing, supra note 40, at 78 ("Perhaps most often, the standing inquiry is a veiled 
reflection of the Court's view of the attractiveness of the litigant's case on the merits." (footnote 
omitted)); see also Doemberg, supra note 44, at 95 (citing repeated, categorical inconsistencies); 
Winter, supra note 26, at 1470 (pointing to Simon as a decision on the merits). Some commenta-
tors, while ackoowledging a dearth of principle in the Court's development of standing doctrine, 
have tried to explain the phenomenon with other theories. See id. at 1373-74 (attempting to 
explain inconsistencies of Court's standing jurisprudence by human cognition theories); Fletcher, 
supra note 42, at 243 (ackoowledging Court's "lawlessness" in applying traceability and redres-
sability requirements, but arguing that seriousness of charge depends on nature of specific stat-
utes or clauses at issue in particular cases). Although these ideas raise interesting possibilities, 
they remain consistent with the broad view that the Court has subjectively misapplied standing 
doctrines. 
191. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
192. See Fletcher, supra note 42, at 223, 234-35. 
193. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 n.26 (1984). 
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limitations.194 But in Allen v. Wright, 195 the Court invoked separation 
of powers to support its pivotal finding that the injuries which parents 
of students of color alleged were not traceable to the government's 
failure to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private 
schools.196 After purporting to explain the absence of traceability with 
conventional causation analysis, 197 the Court turned to federalism 
analysis, upon which it also claimed to base its traceability decision.198 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Allen, sharply criticized the major-
ity's separation of powers alchemy, noting that the Court had pro-
vided no basis for lower courts to apply its new reasoning199 and 
hinting that the Court had developed a back door approach to the 
merits.200 Commentators have made the latter charge explicit, attack-
ing the separation of powers approach to causation as unprincipled.201 
Commentators have also pointed out the fundamental irrelevance of 
separation of powers concerns to traceability and to the mechanics of 
constitutional standing as a whole.202 Finally, they have criticized the 
Court's invocation of federalism on its own terms, arguing that federal 
courts should take responsibility for giving citizens opportunities to 
194. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see also Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 
133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (invoking separation of powers to support prudential denial of stand-
ing), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 40, at 657 (ex-
horting Court to solve legitimate separation of powers problems under appropriate doctrines 
rather than wrongly addressing them under standing analysis). 
195. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
196. See Allen. 468 U.S. at 759-61 & n.26. This tendency had found its way into previous 
decisions, see Nichol, Rethinking Standing, supra note 40, at 78, but had never emerged as a 
dominant factor in standing analysis. 
197. See 468 U.S. at 756-59. 
198. The Court said, in part: 
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine explains why our cases 
preclude the conclusion that respondents' alleged injury "fairly can be traced to the chal-
lenged action" of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way generally for suits challeng-
ing, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs 
agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations. 
468 U.S. at 759 (citation omitted). This explanation carries echoes of both the prudential bar 
against standing to air generalized grievances and of sovereign immunity principles. Its relation-
ship to the problem of causation is less obvious. 
199. 468 U.S. at 792 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
200. 468 U.S. at 790-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court's approach in-
volves "the justiciability of the issues that respondents seek to raise"). 
201. See, e.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing, supra note 40, at 641, 657-58. 
202. See id. at 645-49 (argning vigorously that "standing is not a separation of powers doc-
trine"); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1469 (Court's views on separation of powers "are quite dis-
tinct from notions of causation"); cf. Floyd, supra note 42, at 891 (advocating separation of 
powers as central factor in standing analysis based on zone of interests approach). While Profes-
sor Floyd approves of a focus on separation of powers in standing, the fact that he does so in the 
context of advocating a zone of interests approach validates the other commentators' objections. 
Separation of powers has always played a key role in the prudential standing limitations on 
which Floyd, unlike Professors Nichol and Sunstein, would refocus standing analysis. See Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975). Floyd makes no case for concentrating the constitu-
tional analysis which the Court currently purports to follow on separation of powers concerns. 
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challenge allegedly illegal agency acts. 203 
The question whether a minor-party presidential candidate can 
challenge a debate sponsor's tax exemption, like any question of stand-
ing, requires analysis under the Supreme Court's doctrines. But the 
Court has rendered those doctrines ultimately doubtful enough to 
open standing questions to more broad-based inquiry. Indeed, the 
Court's imposition of separation of powers concerns invites an exami-
nation of the public interests involved in standing questions, assuming 
that standing gives plaintiffs an opportunity to prevail on the merits. 
Such an examination benefits standing analyses by offering an alterna-
tive to the Court's policy priorities and by countering the Court's dis-
regard for the serious public concerns inherent in standing battles. 
B. Systematic Barriers to Minor-Party Candidacies 
The two-party system has become a reality of U.S. presidential 
politics. 204 This situation has not developed through the unchecked 
flow of natural political passions. Rather, the political system of the 
United States has instituted a battery of legal and structural barriers to 
significant minor-party participation in presidential elections. 
The system the United States uses to choose the President and 
members of Congress, which political scientists call "plurality vot-
ing,"205 provides the most pervasive impediment to minor-party candi-
dacies in national elections.206 U.S. elections reward candidates who 
receive the most votes in each individual contest, unlike European-
style parliamentary systems, which apportion seats among all parties 
surpassing a certain threshold. According to political thinker Maurice 
Duverger, plurality voting tends to create and maintain two-party sys-
tems. 207 The mechanism is simple: candidates enter elections to win, 
the Constitution defines winning as securing a plurality of votes on a 
single ballot, and the resultant need to maximize votes fosters a system 
203. See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1472; Doernberg, supra note 44, at 99-102. 
204. Since 1924, only five minor-party candidates have made significant dents in the major 
parties' dominance of the popular vote: Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond in 1948; Harry F. 
Byrd in 1960; George Wallace in 1968; and John Anderson in 1980. Only three, Thurmond, 
Byrd, and George Wallace, won any electoral votes, all in the South and largely through racist 
appeals. None of the five came close to winning the presidency. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, 
at 21-23. 
205. See, e.g., William H. Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR 
PoLmCAL CoNSEQUENCES 19, 19 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986). 
206. This Note often refers to "national elections," which include congressional as well as 
presidential elections. For purposes of this discussion, the differences between the two types of 
elections are often minimal: each depends upon a constituency's popular votes, federal election 
laws and norms govern both, and the major parties have generally dominated both. Where dif-
ferences become important, as for example in considering state ballot access problems for presi-
dential candidates, this Note will specify the election to which it refers. 
207. See Maurice Duverger, Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND 
THEIR PoLmCAL CoNSEQUENCES, supra note 205, at 69, 69. 
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with the minimum number of competitors. 208 This process discour-
ages minor-party candidacies by encouraging candidates to build co-
alitions. before elections; the electorate's multiplicity of view.s thus 
collapses around two poles, each rather close the center, instead of 
finding expression in a multiplicity of parties and candidates. 209 
Several factors exacerbate this process in contemporary presiden-
tial elections. First, the expense and complexity of building a nation-
wide plurality prevents minor parties from competing fully with the 
better-endowed major parties.210 Second, the electoral college sys-
tem211 minimizes third parties' chances by ignoring their showings in 
states where they do not win pluralities, thereby hampering minor par-
ties' influence as nationwide "spoilers."212 Most importantly, primary 
elections and other intraparty nominating contests preempt minor par-
ties by enveloping multifarious ideological conflicts in intraparty 
frameworks and dispensing with those conflicts before the general 
election.213 Primaries also give the major parties control over access 
to the political stage because the major parties, through state govern-
ments, set the rules governing eligibility for primaries.214 Primaries 
and other intraparty nominating contests, although extraconstitu-
tional components of national elections, have become as much fixtures 
of those elections as the electoral college. 
The federal and some state governments have created other provi-
sions outside the Constitution's basic dictates to prevent or discourage 
minor-party participation in presidential elections. The Federal Elec-
208. See Riker, supra note 205, at 21. Riker slightly amends Duverger's law by including 
exceptions for countries in which national third parties retain continuous influence as local sec-
ond parties and where one party among several is a consistent plurality winner. Id. at 32. 
Neither of these exceptions affects the law's application to the United States. 
209. See id. at 21. Riker contrasts this pattern with events occurring under electoral systems 
which allocate representation proportionally and those which require a runoff vote in the absence 
ofa simple majority. Because neither of these systems requires candidates to maximize votes at 
the initial stage, neither fosters a two-party system. Id. European parliamentary nations provide 
evidence of the difference in proportional systems. Runoff systems persist in some American 
states' election systems. 
210. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 11. Smallwood argues that this difficulty has ac-
counted for the regional limitations of most of the important minor-party movements in U.S. 
history. 
211. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
212. See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA: CmzEN RE-
SPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 17 (1984). The electoral college has contributed to regional 
minor parties' greater historical success relative to national minor parties. Id. See also William 
H. Flanigan & Nancy H. Zingale, United States, in ELECTORAL CHANGE IN WESTERN DEMOC-
RACIES: PATTERNS AND SOURCES OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY 23, 26 (Ivor Crewe & David 
Denver eds., 1985). 
213. See Peter F. Galderisi & Benjamin Ginsberg, Primary Elections and the Evanescence of 
Third Party Activity in the United States, in Do ELECTIONS MATTER? 115, 127-28 (Benjamin 
Ginsberg & Alan Stone eds., 1986). Galderisi and Ginsberg's study deals only with primary 
contests, but their analysis applies with equal force to district caucuses and other intraparty 
nominating contests that winnow often large fields of hopefuls down to a single candidate. 
214. See id. at 121-22. 
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tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974215 discriminate against mi-
nor-party candidates by providing the major-party presidential 
candidates with tens of millions of dollars in preelection subsidies and 
opening large areas of election conduct to unlimited spending by state 
and local major-party committees; minor parties can receive public 
funds only after passing certain performance thresholds in national 
elections.216 This discriminatory public financing framework exacer-
bates minor parties' inherent fundraising disadvantage.217 
Even more invidious have been some states' discriminatory restric-
tions on ballot access for minor parties. Major parties in many states 
have manipulated state laws to require early filing deadlines, demand 
prohibitive numbers of petition signatures in order for minor-party 
candidates to appear on state ballots, or restrict general election access 
for candidates who lost primaries.218 The Supreme Court has inter-
vened in this arena, striking down a state's early filing deadline for 
independent presidential candidates on equal protection grounds.219 
Beyond their direct deleterious effects on minor-party candidacies, 
these structural barriers discourage voters from supporting minor-
party candidates. Put succinctly, "Third party candidates also do 
poorly because most people think they will do poorly. The prophecy 
that a candidate cannot win is self-fulfilling .... "220 Political scien-
tists have dubbed constituent behavior in a regime hostile to minor 
parties "sophisticated voting."221 According to this straightforward 
theory, "the voter takes account of anticipated votes by others and 
then votes so as to bring about the best realizable outcome for him-
self .... "222 Thus voters who actually prefer a minor-party candidate 
may nonetheless choose the less offensive major-party candidate out of 
fear that their votes would be wasted on their first choice. 223 This 
215. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). Congress added these amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441a-455 (1991). 
216. See RosENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 25-26. The authors characterize FECA as 
"a major party protection act,'' pointing out that only seven percent of the multistate minor-
party presidential candidates to emerge since 1840 would have qualified for FECA's retroactive 
public financing. Id. at 25-27. 
217. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 11. 
218. See id. at 10; ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 19-24. 
219. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). The Court rejected the state's argu-
ment that its early deadline provided for equal treatment of all candidates by requiring major-
party candidates to file for their parties' primaries by the same date when minor-party candidates 
had to file for the general election; the Court stressed that the burdens which the two require-
ments placed on parties differed greatly. 460 U.S. at 799-801. The Court also disdained the 
state's asserted interest in "political stability" as an impermissible "desire to protect existing 
political parties from competition." 460 U.S. at 801. 
220. ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 39. 
221. See, e.g., Riker, supra note 205, at 33-35. 
222. Id. at 34. 
223. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 9; BRUCE I. NEWMAN & JAGDISH N. SHETH, A 
THEORY OF PoLmCAL CHOICE BEHAVIOR 40 (1987). 
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structural obstacle may hinder minor-party female candidates and 
candidates of color, members of groups often marginalized out of the 
major parties, who must overcome significant popular prejudices as 
well as "sophisticated" biases against minor parties.224 
These structural provisions present a formidable barrier to minor-
party presidential candidacies. Together they comprise an electoral 
obstacle course. This situation generates arguments both for and 
against standing for minor-party candidates to challenge debate spon-
sors' tax exemptions. If exclusion of minor-party candidates was a 
critical and deliberate motivation behind the constitutional barriers, 
then such parties are justly doomed to failure. Subsequent structural 
barriers to minor-party candidacies, the argument goes, are as legiti-
mate as they are formidable and therefore weigh strongly against a 
judicial forum for a deservedly futile insurgency against the system. 
If, on the other hand, barriers to minor-party candidates are an unin-
tended and undesirable side effect of the Constitution's electoral 
framework, then those barriers should not discourage adjudication of 
minor-party candidates' rights. To the contrary, courts should maxi-
mize those rights within proper constitutional boundaries; challenges 
to the tax exemptions of debate sponsors may provide them an excel-
lent vehicle. 
The guiding precepts of American democracy do not foreclose mi-
nor-party success. The Constitution did not establish a two-party sys-
tem; the political system realigned repeatedly during the years 
following independence. Structural barriers to minor parties have 
changed over time; the lower they are, the likelier are minor-party 
candidates to succeed.225 Political scientists have suggested that parti-
san realignments, in the natural course of American political events, 
might lead to greater success for minor parties. 226 Within constitu-
tional limits, we should let nature take its course. Structural barriers 
to minor-party electoral participation should encourage judicial atten-
tion to minor parties' grievances. 
224. See generally JUDITH s. TRENT & ROBERT V. FRIEDENBERG, PoLmCAL CAMPAIGN 
CoMMUNICATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 113-17 (1983) (discussing barriers that public 
perception presents to female candidacies); SMALLWOOD, supra note l, at 25 (discussing difficul-
ties that minority groups face in entering the political arena). 
225. See ROSENSTONE ET AL, supra note 212, at 148-49. 
226. See Flanigan & Zingale, supra note 212, at 23-24; see also David W. Brady & Joseph 
Stewart, Jr., When Elections Really Matter: Realignments and Changes in Public Policy, in Do 
ELECTIONS MATTER?, supra note 213, at 19 (arguing that occasionally elections effect political 
realignments with important policy consequences). Beyond the possibility of particular partisan 
realignments, the United States has experienced a general decline in partisanship as the decisive 
factor in voters' choices of candidates, with personalities and ideology making increasingly 
greater impressions. See KRAus, supra note 5, at 7-8, 17. See generally NEWMAN & SHETH, 
supra note 223, at 31, 35 (summarizing and confirming growing importance of ideological issues 
and personalities over partisan preferences). 
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C. The Importance of Television Exposure 
1. Television Exposure in General 
[Vol. 90:838 
In contemporary elections for national office, candidates cannot 
communicate directly with all voters about all of the concerns which 
animate campaigns. The issues have become too complex and varied, 
the electorate too divided. In this climate, "[m]ass communication 
has become the center stage for all major political events."227 The 
mass media, most importantly television,228 have come to dominate 
many critical processes in elections, including setting agendas, legiti-
mating candidates, and determining candidates' public images. 
Over the past three decades political theorists have argued con-
vincingly that the media play an increasingly critical if often un-
focused role in determining which issues achieve prominence in 
campaigns.229 News outlets' decisions about which issues to stress dic-
tate voters' priorities in analyzing candidates; in one political scien-
tist's words, the media "is stunningly successful in telling its readers 
what to think about."230 
This role has gained force as television has become the major 
source of the information which voters consider.231 Although televi-
sion has generally aided major-party candidates, its agenda-setting 
function holds great potential for minor-party candidates. First, mi-
nor-party candidates often run primarily to place unpopular views on 
the public policy map. Second, ideology and personality, the candi-
date characteristics which television communicates most successfully, 
227. TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 124; see also F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON, 
MEDIA PoLmcs 1 (1984) (stating thl\t "[n]ewspapers, radio, newsweeklies, and television have 
become the major sources of information about election campaigns for most U.S. citizens"). 
228. See generally ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 1; KRAUS, supra note 5, at 7-27. Professor 
Kraus stresses that "the relationship between television and the voter" has elevated television to 
its pinnacle of electoral influence. Id. at 19. 
229. See, e.g., TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 145-48. Professors Trent and 
Friedenberg identify the focus on agenda-setting as one of several, not necessarily exclusive, mod· 
els of the media's role in campaigns. While conceding that the media's role in agenda·setting has 
varied too widely in different circumstances to generate a universal axiom, the authors assert that 
continuing research on agenda-setting effects bodes well for the model's acceptance. Id. at 148; 
see also THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE MASS MEDIA ELECTION: How AMERICANS CHOOSE 
THEIR PRESIDENT 95-105 (1980). 
230. BERNARD c. CoHEN, THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1963), quoted in TRENT 
& FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224 at 146; see also ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 13-14. Professor 
Arterton notes that "U]oumalists ••• retain ultimate control over what is disseminated as the 
news of the day,'' id. at 13, and argues that journalists may choose to intrude on the electoral 
process rather than allow candidates to manipulate the contents of their stories. This argument 
affirms both the influence of candidates' media strategies and the ultimate power of media outlets 
themselves. 
231. See KRAus, supra note 5, at 17. Professor Kraus stresses that television makes a power-
ful impact on voters because it communicates "not by mere transmission alone, but by a series of 
condensed statements about issues; by the camera closeups of ••• candidates, and their nonverbal 
cues that elicit emotional responses in voters; and by the rehashing and reassessing of candidates' 
television performances by commentators." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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are the same factors that have eroded American voters' traditional 
partisan affiliations.232 Finally, television undermines parties' author-
ity in the presidential candidate selection process by giving candidates 
a direct line of communication with voters.233 
Even more potentially valuable to minor-party candidates is the 
mass media's prominent role in familiarizing candidates to the vot-
ers. 234 Although this process continues throughout an election, the 
media exert especially strong influence during the "surfacing period," 
when some candidates achieve the status of serious contenders by ob-
taining greater visibility than their opponents.235 Unfortunately for 
minor-party candidates, however, "there is a huge disparity between 
the amount of coverage the media give minor parties and the attention 
they devote to the Democrats and Republicans. " 236 Discussing John 
Anderson's 1980 independent campaign, probably the most widely 
covered minor-party presidential candidacy in the past two decades, 
Professors Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus explain that the media ini-
tially praised Anderson's maverick effort but eventually turned against 
him when they decided that he could not win.237 The lesson, say the 
authors, is that "the media can affect voters' perceptions by concen-
trating on who will win instead of what the candidates are saying. The 
de facto result benefits the major parties. " 238 This result obviously 
disadvantages minor-party candidates like Fulani, who may have sig-
nificant goals short of victory. 
The media perform a related important function in giving candi-
dates access to voters and allowing them to shape their images and 
messages to the circumstances of elections. Use of the mass media has 
become candidates' most efficient means of communicating with vot-
232. See KRAus, supra note 5, at 18; Robert G. Meadow & Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, A Com-
parative Perspective on Presidential Debates: Issue Evolution in 1960 and 1976, in TuE PRESI-
DENTIAL DEBATES: MEDIA, ELECTORAL, AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 33, 57 (George F. 
Bishop et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES] (concluding that "the course 
of modern-day politics may be embodied more than before in the candidates as individuals"). 
233. See KRAus, supra note 5, at 9; see also ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 9. Professor 
Arterton makes the further important point that partisanship has little importance in intraparty 
nominating processes; media projections thus become extraordinarily important during primary 
elections. Id. at 3. 
234. See RosENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 33-35; PATTERSON, supra note 229, at 107-
17. 
235. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 32. 
236. See RosENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 33. "In 1980 the leading newspapers and 
weekly news magazines gave Reagan and Carter about ten times more coverage than all eleven 
third party and independent candidates combined." Id. at 33 (footnote omitted; emphasis in 
original). 
237. See id. at 33-34. 
238. Id. at 34. The mass media largely determine voters' perceptions of candidates' chances 
of victory. See PATTERSON, supra note 229, at 119. An argument exists that the "horse race" is 
the natural and proper focus of campaign coverage. See Richard F. Carter, A Very Peculiar 
Horse Race, in THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra note 232, at 3, 7 (1978). See generally 
ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 143-92. 
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ers. 239 Television in particular gives candidates and their "handlers" 
unparalleled control over the selection and presentation of imagery 
that they want the public to associate with the candidate.240 Of 
course, mass media also provide candidates with a rich opportunity to 
associate negative imagery with their opponents.241 Political scientists 
have consistently found the public's perception of a candidate's image 
to be a more important factor in voting decisions than party identifica-
tion. 242 In short, "[v]oters depend on the mass media for their access 
to a presidential campaign."243 
2. Televised Debates 
Televised debates stand among the most important media specta-
cles in American presidential elections. In one political scientist's 
words, "[t]elevised presidential debates may be unparalleled in modem 
campaigning as an innovation that engages citizens in the political 
process by building large audiences, creating interest and discussion 
among voters, and influencing voting decisions."244 Presidential gen-
eral election debates stand among the most-watched programs on tele-
vision245 and may constitute television's most powerful influence on 
voters' decisionmaking. 246 
Televised debates touch almost every critical aspect of participat-
ing candidates' campaigns. Professors Trent and Friedenberg have 
239. See, e.g., ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 7-8. 
240. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 74. 
241. See, e.g., ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 14 (arguing that reporters are more comfortable 
propagating negative than positive imagery because they believe that the public is less likely to 
construe negative images as partisan). 
242. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 75. 
243. PATTERSON, supra note 229, at 9. 
244. KRAUS, supra note 5, at 123; see also ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 169 (asserting that 
candidates and media cooperate to tum televised debates into "pseudo-primaries," providing a 
sequence of tests of support which the general election would otherwise lack). 
245. See generally KRAus, supra note 5, at 123-26. Kraus points out that 83% of the electo-
rate watched all or part of the Carter/Reagan debate in 1980, while even the earlier Reagan/ 
Anderson debate drew almost half the electorate. Id. at 125. This fact demonstrates not only 
that many viewers will watch a debate involving a minor-party candidate but also that many 
viewers will watch a debate which one of the major-party candidates snubs. The 1984 Reagan/ 
Mondale debates drew audience shares conservatively estimated at 66% and 57%. Id. at 126. 
246. See id. at 127-28. After surveying data on televised debates from 1960 through 1980, 
Kraus concludes that "[o]ver half of the voting-age public rely on televised debates for decision 
making." Id. at 128; see also Lee B. Becker et al., Debates' Effects on Voters' Understanding of 
Candidates and Issues, in THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, supra note 232, at 126, 138 (concluding 
from survey data that 1976 presidential debates increased voters' knowledge of the candidates 
and dictated the issues about which voters learned the most during the campaign). But cf. John-
son v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (contending that "exclusion of [minor-party 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates] from the debates did not prevent them from waging 
an effective campaign"). Petitioners in Johnson gained ballot access in nineteen states and fin-
ished fifth in the 1984 presidential election. 829 F.2d at 165. The Johnson court's characteriza· 
tion of these results as "effective" seems especially odd given the court's failure to consider 
interests other than victory in evaluating the success of petitioners' campaign. 
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concluded that televised debates perform seven significant functions: 
they draw audiences far larger than any other electoral communica-
tion event; reinforce the candidate preferences of many voters; change 
the preferences of a limited number of voters; help to set voters' agen-
das; increase voters' knowledge of issues; modify lesser known candi-
dates' images; and build confidence in American democracy.247 The 
reinforcement effect, having developed in a climate of traditional parti-
sanship,248 could presumably weaken upon introduction of new electo-
ral forces into televised debates. All of the other effects except the last 
offer distinct advantages to lesser known, minor-party candidates. 
Underdogs' routine desire for debate exposure underscores the 
comparative advantage which minor-party candidates stand to gain 
from equal standing with major-party candidates in televised de-
bates. 249 Frontrunners generally prefer to avoid debating, reasoning 
that they should take few risks when victory is likely.250 Incumbents 
in particular frequently shun debates, largely because incumbents usu-
ally possess greater credibility than their opponents, have better op-
portunities to communicate their ideas to the electorate, and want to 
prevent added exposure for their opponents.251 When challengers can 
secure debates, they generally strike more aggressive postures than 
frontrunners. 252 
John Anderson in 1980 was a prominent example of a minor-party 
247. TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 263-72. Aside from these enumerated ef-
fects of debates, candidates and the media perceive debates as extremely important. See, e.g., 
ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 169-73. 
248. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 265-66 (describing support for rein-
forcement effect only from past bipartisan presidential elections). 
249. See, e.g., Robin Toner, Networks to Hold Election Debates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, 
at Al8 (describing "delight[]" oflittle-known contenders for 1992 Democratic presidential nom-
ination at prospect of a series of prime-time debates). 
250. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 244-45. In a related point, Professors 
Trent and Friedenberg argue that the presence of a third candidate in an election makes debates 
less likely to occur. Id. at 245. The argument does not bear strongly on the discussion in this 
Note, since minor-party candidates would prefer no debates to debates whose many benefits 
accrued only to their major-party opponents. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51. Even 
so, Trent and Friedenberg's argument requires a regime where two-candidate elections are the 
norm and "[t]hird party candidates are not predictable." TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 
224, at 245. If the legal and structural barriers which support this regime softened, and minor-
party candidates became more familiar players in American politics, their effect on other candi-
dates' decisions whether to debate would almost certainly change. Moreover, public expectations 
of presidential debates are making refusal to debate politically risky. Id. at 254. At least one 
scholar has proposed that electoral rules might join political norms in compelling major-party 
candidates to debate by denying federal matching funds to candidates who shun debates. See 
SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 272. 
251. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 246. The D.C. District Court in Brady 
unwittingly confirmed this trend when, in an attempt to undercut the value of media exposure 
through debates, it noted that "in the 1988 debates then Vice-president Bush actually negotiated 
for less rather than more opportunities to engage in debate appearances with his challenger Gov-
ernor Dukakis." Fulani v. Brady, 729 F. Supp. 158, 163 n.8 (D.D.C. 1990). 
252. See, e.g., KRAus, supra note 5, at 121 (citing studies on candidates' statements in 1976 
and 1980 presidential debates). 
878 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:838 
candidate eager for debates' legitimating effects.253 Anderson's 
strange journey from inclusion to exclusion during the 1980 general 
election illustrates ways in which our system has failed to develop 
principled standards to determine which candidates may participate in 
debates. The League of Women Voters Education Fund, sponsor of 
the 1980 debates, invited Anderson to join in that campaign's first de-
bate. 254 But President Carter refused to participate, diminishing pub-
lic interest in the debate. 255 The chastened League applied an 
exclusionary standard, based upon showings in national opinion polls; 
Anderson had fallen beneath the threshold between the two debates, 
clearing the way for a major-party showcase.256 Beyond its apparent 
lack of principle as conceived in 1980, scholars criticized the use of 
opinion polls to determine debate eligibility as unreliable,257 prompt-
ing the League to move to a more lengthy set of criteria.258 But ques-
tions about fairness to minor-party candidates have persisted, 
intensifying when the League gave way in 1988 to a new sponsoring 
consortium consisting of the Democratic and Republican National 
Committees themselves. 259 
253. See id. at 46-52; TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 248-54. 
254. See TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 249. 
255. See id. at 249-50. Carter correctly characterized the debate between Reagan and An· 
derson as a Republican forum; the political similarity of Reagan and Anderson may have caused 
much of the public's apathy. 
256. The League announced that the standard for inclusion was a 15% showing in the polls, 
which happened to be Anderson's level of support at that time. KRAus, supra note 5, at 111. 
Anderson fell to 10% by the time the League announced its invitations for the second debate. 
TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 250. Commentators have suggested that the 
League's standard was initially a device to accede to public pressure to include Anderson, 
KRAus, supra note 5, at 47, 111, and that the League later "sought a rationale for not inviting 
[Anderson] to subsequent debates." TRENT & FRIEDENBERG, supra note 224, at 250. Another 
analyst has characterized the exclusion as nominally honest, see SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 
270-71, but still concluded that the League's "task would be made significantly more creditable 
... if firm criteria were established well in advance of election campaigns •••• " Id. at 271. 
257. See KRAUS, supra note 5, at 111 (noting that polls reflect views only at a given moment 
and that sampling errors cause divergent results across polls); ARTERTON, supra note 227, at 169 
(criticizing polls generally as "imprecise because many voters do not decide on a candidate until 
quite late in the race"). 
258. The League resolved to invite only "significant" candidates to two of its three general 
election debates in 1988. Among its standards for "significance" were eligibility for federal 
matching funds, "[a]ctive campaigning in a number of states," "[r]ecognition by the national 
media as a candidate meriting media attention," and "[o]ther factors ••• that in the League's 
good faith judgment may provide substantive evidence of nationwide voter interest in a candi· 
date, such as the extent of campaign contributions and national voter poll results." Fulani v. 
League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (quoting the 
"1988 League of Women Voters Education Fund Democratic Presidential Primary Debates Par· 
ticipant Selection Criteria"). The League applied the same standards for "significance" during 
the primaries within the major parties and during the general election across parties. See League, 
684 F. Supp. at 1188 n.2. The League explicitly set aside its third general election debate for 
major-party candidates only. Id. 
259. No less an authority than the League itself criticized the proposal to transfer debate 
sponsorship to the bipartisan Commission on Presidential Debates. League President Dorothy S. 
Ridings questioned whether "'third party/independent candidates [would] ever get a fair 
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The necessity of mass media exposure to candidates of all parties is 
clear, and televised debates appear to offer greater political opportuni-
ties than any other media events, especially to minor-party candidates. 
But the political process has failed to administer these critical debates 
impartially. Remedying these inequities demands a judicial role to ad-
dress the complaints of minor-party candidates for whom the doors to 
the debating stage have been bolted from the inside. 
D. Standing Based On Public Value of Minor-Party Candidacies 
Despite the handicaps they face in the electoral process, minor-
party candidacies have yielded numerous benefits to American society. 
Minor parties have often proposed and popularized new substantive 
policies which the major parties have lacked the political awareness or 
foresight to develop. 260 The most telling examples come from the 
range of populist, socialist, and farmer and labor-oriented parties 
which flourished during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries.261 Among these parties' policy demands which eventually be-
came law were free public education,262 tougher child labor laws,263 
federal regulation of railroads264 and other corporations, 265 civil ser-
vice reform,266 flexibility in the currency supply,267 an end to antilabor 
injunctions, 268 progressive income taxation, 269 and social insurance for 
the aged210 and unemployed.271 These parties advanced many signifi-
cant political reforms in the United States, including women's 
shake' " from the CPD and argued that " 'sponsorship of presidential forums should be the prov-
ince of an independent, non-partisan organization whose prime concern is providing information 
for the American voter, not advancing partisan interests.' " Panel Suggests Changes in Presiden-
tial Elections, BROADCASTING, Dec. 2, 1985, at 100, 102. 
260. See SMALLWOOD, supra note l, at 26; ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 222-23. 
261. See generally MURRAY s. STEDMAN, JR. & SUSAN w. STEDMAN, DISCONTENT AT THE 
Pou.s: A STUDY OF FARMER AND LABOR PARTIES 1827-1948 (1950); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, 
THE POPULIST MOMENT: A SHORT HlsTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA (1978). 
262. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 13. 
263. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 26. 
264. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 15. 
265. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 26. 
266. See id.; STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 15. 
267. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 18, 21. 
268. See id. at 20. 
269. See id. at 16-17, 18. 
270. See id. at 22-23; SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 26. 
271. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 22-23. 
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suffrage,272 the Australian ballot,273 direct election of Senators,274 pri-
mary elections,275 initiative and referendum276 and recall of elected of-
ficials. 277 Minor parties have made the United States a more just and 
democratic society. 
More broadly, minor parties have served as essential vehicles for 
popular discontent. When the major parties have lacked courage to 
move forward on important issues, frustrated voters have turned to 
minor parties, sending the political establishment an unmistakable 
message. 21s The most important instance of this phenomenon in the 
United States was minor parties' agitation in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury which forced the nation to confront and eventually eradicate the 
disease of slavery.279 In numerous less dramatic instances, the major 
parties have observed the voter discontent which minor parties have 
reflected and have reacted by changing their own policies and plat-
forms. 280 In this respect, minor parties have served as an important 
check on major parties.281 Minor parties, in short, stimulate dialogue 
about the issues of the day, a quality sadly scarce in contemporary 
presidential elections. 282 
The high value of minor-party candidacies confirms that minor 
272. See id. at 16-17, 20; SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 26. 
273. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 20. Ironically, the Australian ballot 
system, under which each state prepares an official ballot with party slates, facilitated discrimina· 
tion against minor parties in ballot access even as it diminished the corruption and inconvenience 
of the old system where each party prepared its own ballots. See RosENSTONE ET AL., supra 
note 212, at 19-20. 
274. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 18, 20-21. 
275. See id. at 21. Like the Australian ballot, primaries became an impediment to minor 
parties' electoral success. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
276. See STEDMAN & STEDMAN, supra note 261, at 21. 
277. See id. 
278. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 221-22; SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 25-
26. 
279. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 25. 
280. See id. at 27. Such effects are not always for the best. George Wallace's hardening 
influence on President Nixon's civil rights policies after Wallace's strong southern showing in 
1968 illustrates the major parties' tendency to coopt minor parties' reactionary as well as pro-
gressive popular appeals. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 222. 
281. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 212, at 222-23; SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 26. 
282. See generally Richard A. Joslyn, Candidate Appeals and the Meaning of Elections, in Do 
ELECTIONS MATIER?, supra note 213, at 9. Joslyn examines several models which attempt to 
explain electoral approaches and finds candidates' appeals during elections generally consistent 
with "ritualistic," issue-free campaigning and "rhetorical," issue-light campaigning rather than 
"policy-oriented" campaigning. He concludes that candidates campaign largely on symbols and 
personalities, diminishing voters' abilities to learn about policy during the election. He does find 
presidential debates relatively policy-heavy compared to such other media events as spot adver-
tisements. Id. at 28. But others have frequently criticized debates for ultimately elevating ap-
pearances over substance. See, e.g., KRAus, supra note 5, at 31; see also NEWMAN & SHETH, 
supra note 223, at 67 (characterizing studies on the importance of issues in voting behavior as 
inconclusive while finding "evidence suggesting that the best single predictor of voting behavior 
is candidate image"). 
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parties play an important role in the American political system whose 
diminution by systematic barriers courts should properly address. But 
this social value may also go far in its own right toward justifying 
standing for candidate plaintiffs like Fulani. Numerous commentators 
have urged a jurisprudence of standing which in some way recognizes 
public rights and interests. 283 Professor Burnham has argued that the 
Supreme Court has inconsistently developed such a jurisprudence, 
through a common law process of making standing judgments based 
on public values in the absence of traditionally cognizable injuries.284 
Burnham bases his positive conclusion in large measure on the Court's 
approvals of standing in constitutional cases involving the effectiveness 
of plaintiffs' votes. 285 The Court has never explicitly condoned such 
an analysis, which would appear to conflict strongly with the current 
Court's tendency to restrict judicial reach,286 but the current status of 
standing doctrine287 leaves such a novel analysis doctrinally viable. 
If the Court has, as Burnham argues, implicitly adopted public 
value analysis to allow it to vindicate critical rights where no cogniza-
ble injury exists, then it should extend that analysis to minor-party 
challenges to debate sponsors' tax exemptions. These cases involve 
crucial rights and interests in the political process, the most vital ar-
tery of our democratic system. The judiciary should recognize that 
every citizen has a strong interest in minor parties' robust performance 
of their important sociopolitical functions. 288 The greatest difficulty in 
articulating a public value basis for these challenges, of course, lies in 
283. See Doemberg, supra note 44, at 95 (arguing based upon "our Lockean constitutional 
heritage" that courts should recognize "collective rights" as a sufficient basis to support stand-
ing); Nichol, Rethinking Standing, supra note 4-0, at 79 (criticizing Supreme Court's failure to 
accommodate "shared constitutional claims"); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1458 (arguing that 
regulatory injuries are "best characterized as systemic, collective or probabilistic"); Winter, supra 
note 26, at 1374, 1491 (contending that access to courts should not be "limited to •.. private 
disputes" and advocating a "reconstituted public rights model" of standing). 
284. See Burnham, supra note 4-0, at 107. 
285. See id. at 88-90. Burnham also illustrates his argument with examples from other equal 
protection cases. See id. at 83-88. 
286. For a discussion of the Court's use of separation of powers principles to limit judicial 
reach by restricting standing, see supra text accompanying notes 193-203. One naturally assumes 
tension between an expansion of standing and separation of powers. See, e.g., Nichol, Rethinking 
Standing, supra note 4-0, at 79. But Burnham argues credibly that common law public value 
adjudication of standing disputes raises only minor separation of powers and institutional compe-
tence concerns. See Burnham, supra note 4-0, at 116-17. 
287. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text. 
288. Courts have regularly underestimated this interest. See Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 
165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that exclusion of minor-party candidates from debates did not 
violate voters' First Amendment rights to express their electoral preferences); Chandler v. Geor-
gia Pub. Telecommunications Commn., 917 F.2d 486, 488-89 (11th Cir. 1990) (approving broad-
caster's decision to limit televised debates to major-party candidates as "of the most interest and 
benefit to the citizens of Georgia" and not violative of First Amendment), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 
71 (1991); Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (completely failing to discuss possi-
bility of injuries to electoral process resulting from debate sponsor's exclusion of minor-party 
candidates). 
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sorting out the large variety of interests at stake and determining pre-
cisely which ones minor-party candidates should properly advance as 
plaintiffs. But as citizens whom political dissatisfaction has driven 
into the electoral fray, minor-party candidates are logical vehicles to 
vindicate many futerests which they both share with and advance for 
the rest of society. 
The work of political scientists reveals several realities about mi-
nor-party candidates, media politics and the American political system 
in general which bear directly on the question whether courts should 
find standing for such minor-party candidates. The widely held con-
clusions of scholars that American society has stacked the political 
deck against minor parties, that televised debates are extremely impor-
tant sources of electoral exposure, and that minor-party candidates 
provide society several distinct benefits strongly support standing for 
such challenges. Whether or not courts heed these particular conclu-
sions, the political science literature on these topics is thorough, rele-
vant, and revealing enough that it should inform future judicial 
deliberations about standing disputes in similar cases. 
IV. BEYOND THE STANDING ISSUE 
This Part briefly explores the practical likelihood that standing for 
minor-party candidates to challenge debate sponsors' tax exemptions 
will actually lead to more diverse televised debates. It first evaluates 
the available evidence to determine whether minor-party candidate 
plaintiffs might actually carry Fulani's approach to victory on the 
merits and concludes that such success is clearly possible. Minor-
party candidate court victories would force the political system to de-
velop nonpartisan methods for deciding which candidates may partici-
pate in debates; this Part briefly discusses prospects for new selection 
methods. 
Close analysis of any standing controversy begs the question 
whether the claim at issue has any chance of success on the merits. 
The question is certainly fair in the setting of minor-party candidates' 
challenges to debate sponsors' tax exemptions, because to grant the 
relief Fulani requested would require potentially serious reforms of the 
U.S. political system. Indeed, the Second Circuit's rejection of Fu-
lani's claim on the merits289 would appear to render the standing issue 
academic. But the Second Circuit opinion left significant hope that 
future minor-party plaintiffs might prevail on the merits of challenges 
to debate sponsors' tax status. The court rested its ultimate rejection 
of Fulani's claim squarely on the fact that the action had arisen out of 
Fulani's exclusion from primary election debates. The court endorsed 
Fulani's central claim that a debate sponsor which advanced some 
289. See Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir. 1989). 
February 1992] Note-Minor-Party Candidates' Standing 883 
parties over others would violate its tax-exempt status under section 
50l(c)(3).290 It proceeded to stress the "critical importance" of the 
fact that "the subject debates were not general election debates. 
Rather, they were primary season debates .... "291 Because of what it 
saw as "the goals underlying the primary phase of the presidential 
election contest - i.e., to resolve intra-party disputes and select 
among competing candidates -"292 the court rejected Fulani's plea 
for inclusion in the primary season debates. 
Although the court's treatment of primary debates may seem 
mechanically appealing, it loses force when the inquiry widens to 
whether a tax-exempt organization may help a political party resolve 
its internal disputes, particularly where the organization's activity 
yields side benefits for the party, and truly remain "nonpartisan." But 
whatever the outcome of that argument, the court's approach strongly 
suggests that it would rule differently in a general election setting than 
it did in League. The court did not directly state that it would have 
granted Fulani relief on a similar claim in a general election setting; 
but at no point did it even hint at any basis for denying relief other 
than the case's primary election context. The only firm conclusion 
which the opinion permits is that the court wholly reserved judgment 
on the merits of Fulani's claim as it might arise in a general election 
setting. Given the court's sympathy to Fulani's general arguments, as 
reflected in its disposition of the standing issue, prospective minor-
party tax-status challengers must view the Second Circuit's deferral of 
Fulani's underlying claims as encouraging precedent. 
Victory on the merits for a minor-party candidate plaintiff would 
require new, truly nonpartisan standards for including candidates in 
debates that would avoid practically untenable mobs of debaters.293 
Development of such standards, although bound to stir controversy, 
would be very feasible. Common sense recommends two exceedingly 
practical criteria: presence on all fifty state ballots294 and qualification 
for federal matching funds. 295 These tests would have the benefit of 
limiting the stage to those few candidates with demonstrated commit-
290. 882 F.2d at 629. 
291. 882 F.2d at 629. 
292. 882 F.2d at 630. 
293. Courts, scholars and members of the media have all worried that expanding debates 
beyond two parties would lead to unwieldy mass debates. See, e.g., Fulani v. Brady, 729 F. Supp. 
158, 163 (D.D.C. 1990) (claiming that redress of plaintiff's alleged injuries would involve partici-
pation of "dozens of other presidential contenders"); KRAus, supra note 5, at 139 (pointing out 
difficulty of choosing debate participants from among "usually upwards of 100 qualified candi-
dates"); How To Work in the New Debate Climate, BROADCASTING, May 7, 1984, at 88, 89 
(quoting broadcaster's intention to limit minor-party candidate participation if it created " 'un-
wieldy' " debates). 
294. See SMALLWOOD, supra note 1, at 272. 
295. The League included but did not stress this criterion in its 1988 selection standards. See 
supra note 258. 
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ments to their campaigns296 while avoiding the circular attempts to 
determine "significance" which have undermined previous standards 
for inclusion.297 A third component, evaluation of each candidate's 
value to the national political conversation, might also deserve consid-
eration, although its subjectivity would obviously make it difficult to 
develop and administer. A new regime might also create incentives to 
debate, preventing major-party candidates from ducking voters' 
scrutiny. 298 
A fair solution to minor-party candidates' exclusion from presiden-
tial debates would wipe an ugly blot off the nation's democratic polit-
ical process.299 Federal courts, as the only governmental institutions 
which stand almost completely outside that process and the two-party 
oligarchy which controls it, must take the lead in confronting the 
problem. 300 Allowing minor-party candidates to litigate their com-
plaints, in contrast to seeking reforms through the political process, 
will offer the optimal combination of potentially far-reaching relief 
and measured, serious contemplation of the issues at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's standing doctrine, while hardly crystalline, 
supports granting minor-party candidates standing to challenge the 
tax exemption of a sponsor who excludes them from televised presi-
dential debates. The plaintiff's injuries, in such a case, are easily cog-
nizable as injuries-in-fact under a competitor standing theory. The 
source of those injuries, the government's grant of tax exemption to 
the televised debate sponsor, stands well within the limits of causal 
certainty which the Court's traceability and redressability tests re-
quire, as the Court has demonstrated in several decisions finding 
standing for similar challenges to the regulatory status of third parties. 
The Second and D.C. Circuits' competing applications of these 
rough principles to the problem demonstrate that granting standing in 
296. In 1980, only John Anderson and Libertarian candidate Ed Clark joined the mnjor-
party candidates on all 50 ballots; only Anderson qualified for matching funds. SMALLWOOD, 
supra note 1, at 255, 262. Fulani met both standards in 1988. Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 
1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). The only caveat to these criteria's extraordinary 
narrowing effects may be that the federal campaign finance system and some states' ballot access 
procedures continue to raise disproportionate hurdles to minor-party candidacies. See supra text 
accompanying notes 215-19. 
297. See supra notes 256, 258. 
298. See supra note 250. 
299. "The government of any democracy, let alone one shaped by the values of our Constitu-
tion's First Amendment, must avoid tilting the electoral playing field, lest the democracy itself 
become tarnished." Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1337 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). 
300. See generally Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1444 (noting, in regulatory context, that rigid 
standing prohibitions permit those with greater political and economic power to influence poli-
cies through the political process, while less-advantaged interests effectively lack an avenue to 
respond). 
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this instance better satisfies the Supreme Court's precepts and the 
principles underlying standing. The Second Circuit's recognition of 
the breadth and depth of the injuries which exclusion from televised 
debates caused Fulani create a compelling foundation for standing. 
Such a thorough appraisal of Fulani's injuries undermines the causa-
tion arguments which the D.C. Circuit raises against standing: Fu-
lani's broad-based and severe loss of competitive advantage is clearly 
traceable to an act which hands a crucial forum to her competitors, 
and a court could redress that loss by forbidding the act. In such a 
case, "prudential" limitations on standing are inapposite. 
The conclusions of political scientists that American political insti-
tutions discriminate against minor parties lend the arguments for 
standing both empirical support and social urgency. Unjust and un-
necessary political discrimination against minor-party candidates cre-
ates a breach into which the independent judiciary is ideally suited to 
step. Televised debates, perhaps the foremost among all of the crucial 
means of media exposure which increasingly decide American elec-
tions, are an ideal starting point for minor-party candidates to assert 
their legal rights. The numerous ways in which minor parties nourish 
our political culture strongly enhance the case for standing and may 
justify standing in their own right to vindicate the public benefits of 
minor-party candidacies. 
